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A PRE-NEGOTIATION GUIDE TO THE CONFLICT IN NORTHERN IRELAND
Padraig O'Malley
June 1996
On

September

1,

1994,

the

Irish

Republican

Army

(IRA)

declared a ceasefire.
The declaration was potentially one of the most significant
developments

1920.

in Irish history since

Ireland was partitioned in

It represented, or at the time it seemed to represent, an

acknowledgement by the IRA and its political wing, Sinn Fein, that
Ireland cannot be united by physical force,

that the armed struggle

of the last twenty five years to drive the British out of Northern
Ireland has not worked, that the strategy of "the Long War," based
on

the

premise

that

if

the

IRA persisted

in

its

campaign

of

violence long enough, Britain would eventually become war-weary and
throw in the towel, has failed; in short, that the central dogma of
Republican theology -

that only physical

force would bring the

British to their negotiating knees, which dates back to 1798 has
been abandoned.
However,

whether the announcement will

settlement of Europe's most enduring civil

lead to a
conflict

peaceful

is another

matter.
First, the declaration is as important for what it did not say
as for what it did say.

The IRA's statement studiously avoided the

use of the word "permanent" with regard to the ceasefire and did
not renounce the use of violence - both of which were markers put
down by the British and Irish governments as prerequisites for a

seat at the negotiating table.

A "complete cessation" of violence

- the terminology used by the IRA - is open-ended.

It leaves the

door open for a return to the use of force sometime in the future,
if the IRA does not get what it wants at the negotiating table.
While

both

governments

found

ways

to

finesse

the

interpretations of the various phraseologies drifting in and out of
the political cyberspace, the British Prime Minister, John Major,
chose for a time to take a stand on the issue, making it clear that
nothing

less

than

an

unambivalent

declaration

of

a

permanent

ceasefire coupled with a renunciation of violence would open the
way for negotiations between the British government and the IRA.
And

then

came

the

added precondition.

The

IRA would

have

to

"decommission" its arms.
The IRA will never be in a position to make such a public
declaration.

When, the IRA, after a protracted period of intense

and often acrimonious debate, accepts the government's position,
the

government

immediately moves

the

goalposts.

The

IRA,

the

government insists, must decommission all its arms before it will
be given a

seat at

a multilateral negotiating table,

an added

precondition for talks, which, Gerry Adams, president of Sinn Fein,
equally insists, the IRA cannot agree to.
A unilateral surrender of its weapons would amount to a humiliating
defeat for the IRA. It would also rob the organization of the only
insurance policy it has that the British will negotiate in good
faith:

without the possession of arms,

the IRA is just one more

small political party in Northern Ireland,

representing ten per

cent of the population, and in easy danger of being marginalized,
as often happens to small parties in similar situations.

Nor is

there any quid pro quo in the offing: no suggestion that a gradual
decommissioning of arms could be coupled with other issues, such as
the release of political prisoners or the elimination of provisions
in the Emergency Powers Act.

Besides, there are no satisfactory verification procedures that can
be put in place that will ensure that the IRA would decommission
all its arms; and even if such sophisticated procedures did exist
and were under the control of international supervision, there is
not the slightest possibility of the Unionists ever accepting that
the IRA would in fact fully decommission its armory.
(Ironically,

the Bri tish Government's success in convincing the

public during the

1980s

that the

IRA,

thanks

to the so-called

Libyan connection, had huge caches of weapons, including state-ofthe-art

missile

Ireland,

hardware,

stockpiled

throughout

both

parts

of

thus ensuring that it could wage war well into the next

century, has so beguiled Unionists that no verification

process~

no

matter how painstaking its procedures would assuage their ingrained
belief

that

the

IRA

was

simply

pulling

a

fast

one

on

the

government. )
The fact is that the decommissioning of arms in a situation of
conflict is a byproduct of negotiations rather than a precondition
for negotiations; it is an outcome rather than an enabler of the
process;
rather

it is a consequence of establishing a climate of trust
than

evolution

of

a

precursor
an

for

agreed-upon

trust;

it

political

is

contingent

framework

on

rather

the
than

something that emerges out of a political vacuum.
One year after it declared a ceasefire, the IRA had little to
show for its efforts, giving more credence in the movement to the
arguments of the hard men, who were only reluctantly persuaded to
the meri ts of a ceasefire,

that the only thing on the Bri tish

agenda is to smash the IRA.
The

IRA

has

faced

this

kind

of

predicament

before

when

the

contradictions of deeply-held positions has led to splits in the
movement between those who believe that the way forward is to join
the

constitutional

process,

despite

its

deficiencies

and

disappointments, and those who believe that physical force is the

only kind of diplomacy the Bri tish understand.
appeared that the former were having their way,
especially

in

the

aftermath

of

the

most

For a

time,

it

but the latter,

recent

bombing

in

Manchester, which practically destroyed the center of the city and
injured over 200 people, are waiting in the wings.
Second,

the IRA did not clarify its position regarding the

question of consent.

Both the British and Irish governments,

in

Article One of the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985, and again in the
Downing street Declaration of December 1993, acknowledged that the
constitutional status of Northern Ireland will change only when a
majority of the people there give their free and full consent to
such a change, and both governments acknowledge that consent ,does
not exist at the present time.

In other words, the question of the constitutional status of
Northern Ireland is not up for negotiation, and whatever talks are

envisioned will not have the issue of how to bring about the unity
of Ireland on their agenda.
It is imperative,

therefore,

that the frame of reference of

what is and what is not on the negotiating table be made crystal
clear before negotiations begin.
finding

common

ground

will

Otherwise,

simply

the possibility of

dissipate

in

a

welter

of

accusations and counter-accusations of betrayal, and the ceasefire
will undoubtedly be among the casualties of the recriminations that
will follow.
Third,
unshakable

the

republican movement

demand:

there

would

has
be

no

always

adhered

ceasefire

to

one

without

a

declaration of intent by Britain to withdraw from Northern Ireland,
even if the date of withdrawal were some twenty or thirty years
down the road,

and even if the guaran tee was in the

private understanding.

form

0

f a

Unionists, in particular, have the right to

demand that the IRA and the British government supply irrefutable

proof that no such deal was struck.
If the past is any guide to the future,

the prospects of the

British convincing the Unionists that no such deal was struck are
dim at best and next to non-existent at worst.

Unfortunately,

there is little the British can do to allay Unionist distrust;
indeed, their actions in the past, if anything, make a prima facie
case for regarding Unionist distrust as being well-founded.

And

this is what will make it so difficult to bring the Unionists to
the table:
for

They have neither forgotten nor forgiven the British

excluding

them

from

the

negotiations

that

led

to

the

Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985, which for the first time gave the
Irish government a consultative role in the affairs of Northern
Ireland.

Yet, without full Unionist participation in the proqess,

peace will never be at hand.

Moreover, vigorous British efforts to

reassure Unionists that no deal was broke red behind their backs
coupled with vigorous Nationalist efforts to boost their position
by exaggerating what the Catholic community might expect in the
future

will

likely

contradictory

result

statements

in

as

a

every

plethora
side

of

tries

confusing
to

put

its

and
own

particular "spin" on matters.
On

13

October

1994,

Loyalist

paramilitaries

1995,

the

announced

declared

a

ceasefire.
On

February

ceasefire and,
detonated

a

9,

IRA

the

end

of

its

to ensure that all and sundry got the message, it

bomb

in London,

killing

two

people

and

seriously

injuring 43 others.
On May 30,

1996 the people of Northern Ireland went to the

polls to elect a deliberative assembly that consisted of ninety
members

elected

appointed,
The

on

a

party

list

system,

and

twenty

members

two to each of the ten parties that topped the poll.
people

of

Northern

Ireland,

perhaps

innured

by

the

experience of almost thirty years of political wrangling and the

5

repeated failure of efforts to secure peace, did not turn out in
droves to elect ths body that would select the negotiating teams to
represent them in all-party talks.
Only 65 per cent of eligible voters went to the polls, hardly
a

turn-out that reflected the people's belief that some sort of

settlement was in the offing. After all,

the IRA had declared in

harsh language that that there would be no decommissioning of arms,
questions of a cease fire aside, until a a final settlement had been
agreed to;

every party had reiterated its unmoveable position;

every side campaigned in the language of belligerence,

not the

language of conciliation.
It

was

an

election

opposed and Unionists

nationalists

(Catholics)

had

bitterly

( Protestants) had vigorously lobbied for.

Ironically, the party that had opposed it the most ( Sinn Fein, the
political wing of the IRA), gained the most, and the party that had
pushed for it the most (the Ulster Unionist Party - representative
of mainstream Protestantism), gained the least.
As usual, Unionists, more apprehensive than ever about their
place in the Union, voted their fears. Although the UUP headed the
ballot with 24 per cent of the vote (30 seats), the DUP secured 19
per cent of the vote (24 seats), a gap of five per cent between the
two

compared to the gap of 12 per cent that existed after the 1993

local elections.

Indeed, it could be argued that the DUP had been

given a mandate to stalemate the talks since it had campaigned on
the platform that it would not talk with Sinn Fein or the Irish
government until

the

IRA had disbanded,

and Dublin had deleted

Articles 2 and 3 from its constitution.
Nationalists
responsible

for

voted
the

their

collapse

hopes.
of

the

Not
IRA's

holding

Sinn

ceasefire

Fein
that

responsibility they laid squarely on the shoulders of the British
-and responsive

to Sinn Fein's appeal

for a mandate

that would

ensure its being seated at the negotiating table, even if the IRA
had not declared a new ceasefire,
6

they gave Sinn Fein the mandate

it sought -

15 per cent of the vote

(17 seats)

compared to the

Social Democratic and Labour Party's 21 per cent of the vote (21
seats).

In other words,

Sinn

Fein secured 43 per cent of

the

Catholic vote - its best showing ever since it had begun to contest
elections in Northern Ireland in 1982.
And, so, in the narrow sense of things, both Sinn Fein and the
DUP,

the

more

traditions made
people

might

extreme

representatives

ground.

settle

But

for

in

their

respective

the elections were not

about what

the

way

of

of
an

accommodation;

the

elections, like all elections in Northern Ireland, were about the
different ways in which tribal beliefs express themselves. There
was not one election but two; the real rivalries are not between
the two traditions but within

them.

Tribal differences are not rival i.e. they do not compete with
each

other;

political

competition

is

intra-tribe.

Tribal

differences complement each other. They provide cohesion for the
tribe and generate the political configurations that become intratribal

rivalries.

Once

there

is

a

common enemy,

all

kinds

of

political rivalries are possible within the tribe. Take away the
enemy and you destroy the cohesion that permit intra rivalries to
flourish.

Hence,

anything

that

might

destabilize

the

status-quo is

threatening. The certainty of unsecurely-held positions is always
preferable to the uncertainty.

Uncertainty increases anxiety;

anxiety means retreat to old, securely-held positions.
Holding on to securely-held positions minimizes the anxiety that
possible change engenders. The psychology that sets the parameters
of conflict is not the psychology of how to manage conflict, but
the psychology of how to minimize the anxieties that underlie the
possibility

of

Ireland,

the

anxieties

have

change,

and

overwhelming
always

been

what

change

imperatives
overarching,
7

entails.
to

In

Northern

minimize

communal

leading

to

permanent

political paralysis.

Sinn Fein's vote did not register support for the IRA, but was
more complex: it was at once a call for a political solution and a
permanent end to violence as a means of achieving political change,
and at once a censure of the British government, and in particular
of what was perceived as its pro-Unionist response to the Mitchell
commission's report on decommissioning, for the collapse of the IRA
ceasefire.

In particular,

it was Irish nationalists response to

the Sinn Fein platform: a vote for Sinn Fein would be a vote for
peace i.e. for the restoration of the ceasefire, thus guaranteeing
Sinn Fein a place at the negotiating table.
In particular,

the increas in the vote for Sinn Fein was a

reflection of what it ran on : A vote for Sinn Fein was a vote for
peace. a vote for another ceasefire, for a negotiated settlement.
Other

parties

that

were

ei ther

elected

qualified under the top ten formula were:
per cent of the vote, 7 seats);

the

to

the

forum,

~liance

or

Party (7

the United Kingdom Unionist Party

(4 per cent of the vote, 3 seats); the Progressive

Unionist Party

(3 per cent of the vote, 2 seats); the Unionist Democratic Party (2
per

cent

of

the

vote,

2

seats);

the

Northern

Ireland Women's

Calition (1 per cent, 2 seats); and Labour (1 percent, 2 seats).
The

Progressive

Democratic

Party

Unionist

(UDP) ,

Party

despi te

their

(PUP)

and

the

rather meagre

Unionist
vote,

are

disportionately important because they are the spokespersons for
the Protestant paramilitary organizations, which have the capacity
to

unleash

an escalating sectarian

Ireland to civil war.

that could bring all of

( It doesn't take much if you put the right

demons in the right bottles) .
The results of the election ensured that talks would begin in
an ambience of polarization rather than one in which the need for
accommodation would guide the proceedings. And true to the spirit
of distrust that permeated the run-up to the election, indeed,
8

that

has permeated the entire history of the Northern Ireland state, on
June 10, when the talks were finally supposed to get under way, the
Unionist parties put aside their mutual suspicions of each other,
and

joined

Mitchell,

forces

to

block

the

appointment

former Majority Leader

in

the

of

Senator

United States

President Clinton's special envoy to Norther Ireland,

George
Senate,

and former

chairperson of the international commission that had examined the
question of how the

cecommissioning of arms might proceed,

as

chairperson of the forum's plenary sessions.
They charged that his Catholic Irish /American background
even though he was raised in a Lebanese family and as a Maronite

not Roman Catholic) and his advocacy of parallel decommissioning
and talks

as

the way to proceed on

the

decommissioning

reflected a bias on his part toward Sinn Fein.

~ssue

Hence, Unionists

argued, he would set a Sinn Fein agenda - even though Sinn Fein had
been barred from taking part in the talks because the IRA had not
declared a new ceasefire. After two days of almost around- the
clock haggling,

Mitchell was seated,

that there would be a
defini tion of his

but with the understanding

review of his powers and a more precise

role .

Paisley,

however,

was

not mollified.

Calling Mitchell "a crony of Gerry Adams," he vowed not to attend
plenary sessions headed by Mitchell.
No matter what scenario one envisaged,
parties

would

participate

negotiating forum,

in

the

there was no way all

opening

sessions

of

the

and no" telling how long it might take to to

bring about a situation of full inclusiveness.
In the absence of the
(indeed,

the

IRA went

out

IRA having called a
of

its

way

to

new ceasefire,

reemphas i ze

that

no

cease fire was in the offing and that no decommissioning would take
place prior to a final agreement), Sinn Fein was not permitted to
participate in the forum's opening sessions. On this question, the
two

governments

were

absolutely

9

adamant:

no

ceasefire,

no

invitation to negotiations. On the other hand, the IRA were equally
adamant: no invitation to negotiations, no ceasefire.
In the end, what Sinn Fein had so vociferously fought for - an
all-party negotiating table, it achieved; yet were denied access on
the

simple

principle

that

if,

the

IRA

would

not

declare

a

ceasefire, one side in an intra-communal conflict would bring a gun
to the table and essentially say that, yes, we will negotiate, but
if we don't get our way, we reserve the right to go back to the use
of violence

to

get

our way

),

Sinn

Fein's

arguments

that

its

performance in the forum elections for the deliberative forum,

a

performance that confounded even the most optimistic of Sinn Fein's
election strategists, cut no ice in Dublin and London.
Ii ttle

ice

with

few

people,

North

or

South;

see

(And cuts

poll

respl ts

ci ted) .
But without Sinn Fein's participation, there can be no lasting
settlement: talks without its being intimately involved will lead
nowhere.

There

is

no

disagreement

about

this;

its

simply

a

statement of the obvious.
If perchance, Sinn Fein's arguments did cut ice - and a good
case can be made why they should, with some very stringent provisos
-

and both governments capitulated to Sinn Fein's demand to be

seated,

neither the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP)

- the mainstream

Unionist party), the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) - the hardline
Unionist

party) ,

the

Alliance

party

(the

pro--Union

Catholic/Protestant party) would participate, while the SDLP (the
party

representing

probability,

the

majority

follow suit.

In short,

of

Catholics

would,

no talks whatsoever.

in

all

End of

peace process.
Indeed, in a concession to Sinn Fein, the British government
is no longer insisting on the IRA decommissioning even some of its
arms as a condition for Sinn Fein's inclusion in talks.
it

had

been

insisting

on

before

10

the

ceasefire

(Something

collapsed

in

door had been opened, the space provided for further dialogue,

and

the Hume/Adams connection continued, one of the key relationships
that was

instrumental

in bringing about

the

IRA's

ceasefire

in

1994.
But, as has always been the case in Northern Ireland, anything
that brings the competing elements of nationalism together, deepens
the divisions between Unionism and nationalism.
Thus, Unionists saw the talks between Sinn Fein and the SDLP
as a rapproachment between the two parties,

as a vindication of

what they had always thought: that the two were in collusion; that
the differences between them were differences about orchestration,
that the music itself was not an issue.
In this sense,

little has changed.

The miasma of suspicion

that poisons every political initiative remains as pervasive as
ever.

Nothing diminishes the suspicion,

and in the long-run,

an

understanding of what are not only the roots of, but the seemingly
permanent "I-told-you-so" dispositions that guide the actions of
both communities is a precursor for any lasting accommodation.
1n

South Africa,

distrust each other.

for

example,

blacks

and

whites

did

Theirs were far more raw emotions.

hated or despised or feared blacks,

not

Whi tes

and blacks hated the white-

imposed system that oppressed them and feared the white-man's power
over their lives. Raw and tough emotions can be dealt with, once
they

are

acknowledged.

Outright

hatred

lends

itself

to

an

antidote; lingering dislike does not.
But
landscape

the

endemic

suspicion

in

Northern

Ireland

that
is

a

permeates
slippery

the

thing.

poli tical
It

has

no

defined boundaries; it is amorphus, shadowy. more powerful in its
lack of expression than in its expression; more difficult to deal
with because they it is the product of illusion.
Will

the current peace process result in their coming into

being a just and lasting peace? I don't think so. But I hope I am

14

wrong.
The problem, as Richard Rose once so pithily put it,

is that

An uneasy accommodation of

there is no solution to the problem.
sorts, yes, perhaps, but no solution.

Republicanism is writhing in the agonies of reappraisal. Some
envisage

a

activities

new

campaign

in

which

to mainland Britain

the

and

IRA

would

Loyalist

confine

violence

its

would be

directed against Dublin. On the other hand, a renewal of a military
campaign in the North would result in a security crackdown and a
return of Loyalist violence directed at Catholics.

According to

the Irish police, the deepest level of support for an increased IRA
campaign exists among republicans living in the Republic and in the
border area of south Armagh and Fermanagh - another case of those
least likely to feel the affects of violence being the most for it.
[The Irish Times

Moreover,

5 June 1996].

Sinn Fein's readiness to sign up to the Mitchell

principles, which call for a renunciation of the use of violence
and decommissioning of all weaponry,

has caused a great deal of

dissension, alarm and concern among the republican rank and file.
As a result, moves,

-

initiated by the Sinn Fein organization in Cork

about as far from Belfast as you can get -

are under way to

convene an extraordinary ard fheis (party conference) to discusss
the decision on Mitchell.

[ Ed Moloney,

The Sunday Tribune,

9 June

1996)
The results of an Irish Times/MRBI pollreleased three days
before talks were due to starts should also provide Sinn Fein with
food for thought. They indicated that in the South most of those
questioned
participate
being met.

believe

that

Sinn

Fein

should

in the

talks

process wi thout

not

be

allowed

to

certain preconditions

Some 38 per cent believe that the IRA should have to

reinstate the ceasefire; another 17 per cent go further and would
require the decommissioning of all arms, and a further 22 per cent

is

February) .
Now it is prepared to consider some variation of the Mitchell
commission's suggestion that the parties should consider talks and
decommissioning taking place in tandem.
But
ceasefire,

this

means

thus

that

even

if

the

enabling

Sinn

Fein

IRA were

to

take

to

its

call

place

a

new

at

the

negotiating table, the DUP would immediately walk out.
Without the DUP, given its electoral mandate - 19 per cent of
the vote, the peace process would stumble, and inevitably grind to
a halt.
Nor is the UUP to be left out of the equation of withdrawals.
While the UUP is now prepared to consider the new decommissioning
proposals

in

a

more

conciliatory

light,

(its

opposition

to

decommissioning to begin only during talks was the springboard that
resulted in elections),

its support is conditional at best,

at

least until it is convinced that the new proposals would work in
practice and that verifiable procedures can actually be put in
place.

How

do

you

decommission

fertilizer,

the

primary

ingredient of the bomb that exploded in London on 9 February 1996?)
That

convincing

remains

to be done.

Any decommissioning

process that does not meet the rigid standards the UUP will insist
upon will lead the UUP, too, in the direction of the door.
Both governments were considering a plan under which the parties
would "take stock" of developments on both the "poli tical"

and

"decommissioning fronts" iIi September - some three months into the
process.
Poli tical
decommissioning

talks

in

issue

with

parallel
the

with

built-in

discussion

of

"review period"

the
would

appear to meet Sinn Fein concerns that the talks process would
simply not gravi tate endlessl y around decommissioning.

Thus,

it

would allow the IRA, before deciding whether to decommission,

to

judge for itself whether the Unionist parties were committed to

11

substantive negotiations.

(But here again, there is a Catch 22: the

IRA says that in the absence of substantive progress indicating
that Unionists are serious about negotiations,

there will be no

decommissioning; Unionists say that in the absence of substantive
progress towards decommissioning,

there will be no negotiations on

the core issues).
But this scenario would require Sinn Fein's involvement in the
negotiating process, and this,
declare a new ceasefire.

in turn, would require the IRA to

And this,

in turn, would lead to a DUP

walk-out.
And so it will go:

political circles

to be squared,

even

cubed.
In the end a ceasefire is inevitable - the alternative,js a
return

to

prospect

the

mayhem and murder

unthinkable,

perhaps

of

at

the

last

last

thirty

stark

years,

enough

in

a
its

implications to finally concentrate minds. One bomb going off in
Northern Ireland would shatter Sinn Fein,

obliterating not only

property and people, but the political gains Sinn Fein had accrued
in the recent elections.
Indeed, that is already happening. The bombing in Manchester
on 15 June 1996, and the murder of a policeman in the Republic a
week earlier, seemed designed to ensure that Sinn Fein would never
get a place in the multi-party talks that are currently staggering
on a precarious course.
Cabe,

shocked Ireland.

The killing of the policeman,
Some 20,000 people,

Jerry Mc

including the Prime

Minister John Bruton and the President Mary Robinson attended
McCabe's funeral.
If the IRA restarts its military campaign in the North, so,
too,

will

the

Loyalists

paramilitaries,

who

in

the

two

years

preceding the cease fires operated with a degree of ruthlessness and
discipline that had the potential to turn civil conflict into civil
war.
Even

if

the

IRA

confined

its
12

operations

to

the

British

mainland,

it would only be a matter of time before the Loyalist

paramilitaries began to retaliate in the South.
Tony Blair,
prime minister

leader of the Labour Party,
in-waiting;

the

Labour

is widely seen as

Party seems

destined to

become the next government, unless it finds some unfathomable way
to

lose

not

to

be

ruled

out,

given

Labour's

penchant

for

imploding at critical electoral moments.
The party's policy regarding Northern Ireland is one that
favors Irish unification, but only with the consent of a majority
of the people of Northern Ireland.

For all practical purposes, the

position is indistinguishable from the position of the Conservative
Party which continues to favor the Union, but only as long as that
is the wish of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland.

The

Labour Party, however, is subtlety less nationalist-oriented than
before, and Blair's decision to support Major on the question of
holding elections in Northern Ireland for a deliberative forum,
despite the bitter opposition of Irish nationalists, infuriated the
SDLP, which had grown used to thinking it had the Labour Party in
its political pocket.
Undoubtedly,
part of the 1980s,

the most significant event of the latter

however,

was the signing of the Anglo-Irish

Agreement (AlA) in November 1985.

The Agreement gives the South a

consultative role in the affairs of the North and an acknowledgment
by Britain that Northern Ireland is not the exclusive preserve of
the British government.

For better or worse,

Anglo-Irish relations in a new context.

the Agreement put

The new context changed

things, but whether it can resolve them is a different question,
one on which the jury is still out.
In 1988,

the SDLP and Sinn Fein,

after a series of secret

meetings between John Hume and Gerry Adams, engaged in an extensive
dialogue

with

one

another.

The

dialogue

ended

inconclusively,

without any common agreement on a pan-nationalist way forward, and
with Sinn Fein's support for the IRA as steadfast as ever.
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But the

would

require

the

IRA to

conuni t

i tsel f

weaponsinparallel with political progress.

to

the

destruction of

Furthermore,only 10 per

cent question the constitutional status of Northern Ireland's link
with Britain and only 10 per cent support the idea of a united
Ireland.
On the

eve of the talks, a poll taken by The Sunday Tribune

spelled out once again

the deep cleaveages

amog Catholics

and

Protestants in Northern Ireland.
On the question of deconunissioning the differences are stark:
70 per cent of Protestants want it to take place inunediately before Sinn Fein should be admitted to talks; only 22 per cent of
Catholics think it should take place inunediately, while 33 per cent
think it should take place only when a settlement is reached ..
Attitudes divide along similar lines with regard to Sinn Fein
and the IRA: 92 per cent of Protestants believe that Sinn Fein and
the IRA are one and the same organization,

while 47 per cent of

Catholics believe they are separate organizations.

( Interestingly,

some 45 per cent of Sinn Fein supporters do not think that they are
separate organizations) .
On the issue of Sinn Fein being allowed to participate in
talks prior to an IRA ceasefire, only 19 per cent of Protestants
would accept Sinn Fein's admission compared with the 97 per cent of
Sinn Fein supporters and 84 per cent of SDLP supporters who would
countenance admission.
There is a great deal of skepticism regarding the prospects
for a settlement acceptable to both conununities emerging from the
talks. Only 24 per cent of Protestants think so; Catholics are more
optimistic - 36 per cent think a settlement likely.
Among Protestants,
local

the most widely-favored outcome is for a

parliament wi thout any cross-border

insti tutions

(36 per

cent); their second most preferred solution is for a powersharing
parliament with cross-border institutions (21 per cent).
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On the

Catholic side, the most preferred solution is is for a powersharing
local parliament wi th cross- border insti tutions

(43 per cent);

their second most preferred solution is for a united Ireland (36
per cent) - only 1 percent of Protestants cited a united Ireland as
an acceptable outcome. Some 75 per cent of Sinn Fein supporters
want a united Ireland to emerge from the talks, whereas only 21 per
cent of SDLP supporters do compared to the 55 per cent who would
settle for power sharing with cross-border institutions.
Overall,

the

outcome

that

commands

the

most

support

is

powersharing with cross-border institutions (31 per cent) - hardly
the stuff of consensus politics.
There is virtually no support for a continuation of Direct
Rule (5 per cent); and almost as little support for an

Indepe~ent

Northern Ireland (7 per cent) .
Asked about Articles 2 and3 of the Republic's constitution,
Protestants want their immediate removal
removal during talks

(37 per cent).

(54 per cent)

or their

Catholics hold diametrically

opposing views: 20 per cent are prepared to consider the move when
a settlement is reached; 30 per cent are prepared to agree to their
removal as part of a settlement; and 24 per cent say that the two
Articles should never be removed from the South's constitution.
On the question of a ceasefire, however, there is overwhelming
unanirni ty -

97 per cent of the people of Northern Ireland want

another ceasefire, including 84 per cent of Sinn Fein supporters.

[The Sunday Tribune 9 June 1996]
But a

reinstatement of a

ceasefire will not bring

lasting

peace. It is a necessary first step, but in itself not a sufficient
one.

In the end it

is the poli ticians

the people of Northern

Ireland have chosen to represent them in negotiations who will have
to find the courage to make the compromises that will build the
trust that will lead them,
political

terrains

they

united in purpose,
must

traverse
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into the uncharted

before

they

reach

the

hollowed ground of a new Ireland.
1t will be a long and arduous process. No party will get what
it wants.

All will have to settle for a lot less than the demands

they have promulgated with such intensity for the better part of
thirty years.
It

will

Protestant,

test

the

Nationalist

mettle

of

who

and Unionist,

we

are,

Catholic

and

Republican and Loyalist,

Irish and British - and who we will become.
COMPONENTS OF THE PROBLEM:

There are three interconnected relationships:
BETWEEN CATHOLIC AND PROTESTANT WITHIN NORTHERN IRELAND
BETWEEN THE PEOPLE OF THE NORTH AND THE PEOPLE OF THE SOUTH.
BETWEEN THE PEOPLES ON THE TWO ISLANDS.

A comprehensive settlement must
relationships.

A second question,

take account of all
however,

relationships is the most critical.

is which of

between

two

political aspirations.

communities

these

Most scholars now tend to

regard the first relationship as the most critical.

conflict

three

with

It involves a

diametrically

opposing

Basically it is a conflict between fewer

than one million Protestants who want to maintain the union with
Britain,

i.e., who want to remain part of the United Kingdom of

Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and just over one-half million
Catholics who want to become part of an all-Ireland state.
The first relationship was ostensibly settled in 1920 when the
Government of Ireland Act set up Northern Ireland as a political
entity in its own right, and,

in 1921 when the Anglo-Irish Treaty

brought the Irish Free state into being.
of

1920 and

1921 were a

failure.

The political settlements

The

resulting partition of

Ireland reinforced cultural and political separatism, making the
development of parallel confessional states inevitable.
turn,

has

made

the

resolution

of
18

the

other

two

This, in

problems

more

difficult,

perhaps even impossible within existing nation-state

frameworks.
Adding

to

the

difficulty

is

the

fact

that

community believes that the second relationship,

the

Catholic

the North/South,

must be resolved before one can address the relationship between
the two communities in the North.
other

hand,

Northern

believes

that

Ireland must

be

The Protestant community, on the

internal
in place

governance
before one

structures

for

can address

the

North/South relationship.
Historically, Ireland has two political traditions.
ONE TRADITION IS CONSTITUTIONAL AND NON-VIOLENT.
THE OTHER TRADITION IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND VIOLENT.
Historically, proponents of the constitutional proved to be
uncannily adept at using ei ther the threat or the fact of the
unconstitutional to gain its own particular ends.
The quasi-acceptance of the unconstitutional has given Irish
poli tics

its

easy

toleration of

toleration of poli tical

poli tical

violence

is

violence.

also made

easier

Impl ici t
for

many

because "the unconstitutional" prevailed in 1921.
Historically, Ireland has three cultures:
A GAELIC-CATHOLIC CULTURE.
AN ANGLO-PROTESTANT CULTURE.
A SCOTS-PRESBYTERIAN CULTURE.
The Presbyterian culture breaks down into two traditions:
THE TRADITION OF THE "OLD LIGHT."
THE TRADITION OF THE "NEW LIGHT."
The

"New Light"

religious tolerance,
Light"

emphasizes

the

emphasis

on

individual

and equal i ty for Catholics,

fundamentalism,

Pope as anti-Christ,
Light"

puts

freedom,

while the "Old

uncompromising Calvinism,

the Catholic Church as an abomination.

Presbyterians were drawn
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to

the

radical

thinking of

the
"New
the

French Revolution and to the United Irishmen,

and for a time it

appeared that an alliance between Catholics and Presbyterians might
prove insurmountable.
In the nineteenth century the "Old Light" prevailed over the
"New

Light,"

giving

Protestantism

in

Northern

particular flavor of evangelical fundamentalism.
continues to be the anti-Christ.
Ulster in 1607,

Ireland

its

For many the Pope

As a result of the plantations in

the Anglo-Protestant and the Scots-Presbyterian

cultures were confined almost exclusively to Ulster, thus giving
the province the characteristics that have set it aside from the
rest of Ireland.

The clash of the three cultures and the divergent

national allegiances they inspire, and the intolerance of each for
the other, are at the root of the conflict in Northern Ireland.
Historically, Ireland has had two sets of starting points:
THE CATHOLIC STARTING POINT IS 1170.
THE PROTESTANT STARTING POINT IS 1607.
In 1170, Norman warriors speaking Norman-French crossed from
England

to

Ireland with

invi tation of the

the

approval

of

Henry

II

Irish chief Dermot MacMurrough.

and

at

the

Republicans

point to this as the beginning of 800 years of English rule.
For

the

first

400

years,

the

English

tried,

with

limited

success, to conquer Ireland but the range of its rule was confined
to a small area around Dublin with perhaps a thirty-mile radius.
In the late eighteenth century, King Henry VIII tried more firmly
to bring Ireland under the control of his Crown,

primarily for

strategic purposes (advances in technology had vastly increased the
range and capability of long sailing ships,

making England more

vulnerable to attack through Ireland by her continental enemies) .
Subsequent

attempts

by

his

successors

to

secure

the

Crown's

authority resulted in a major uprising led by the Ulster chieftain
Hugh O'Neill.

O'Neill's rebellion

20

t

however

t

collapsed with the

defeat of the Irish chiefs at the Battle of Kinsale in 1601.
Kinsale spelled the end of the old Gaelic order.

Within years

the defeated Gaelic chiefs had fled to the continent in what came
to be known as the "Flight of the Earls," thus giving
King James I an opportunity to secure the most rebellious part of
Ireland by colonizing much of Ulster with English and Scottish
settlers.

The new settlers who began to arrive

different.

The Scots were Presbyterians of the most strict and

doctrinaire kind,
the

Protestant

religion

were

in

1607 were

the English were Episcopal Protestants.

starting point.
inextricably

From

linked,

the

and

beginning,

religion

Hence

land and

remained

barrier to assimilation because the settlements took place

the

i~

the

context of the Counter-Reformation.
Moreover,

the colonizations were partial.

At all times the

settlers lived in conditions of maximum insecurity.

Surrounded on

all sides by a dispossessed and hostile native population,
were

always

vulnerable

to

attack.

And

since

the

they

settlements

themselves were often scattered, the threat to survival was all the
greater.
Twice in the course of the seventeenth century,
Irish,

the native

in attempts to win back their confiscated lands,

aligned

themselves with a British monarch, and on both occasions they chose
the losing side in an English civil war.
with Charles I
their

efforts

They aligned themselves

in his dispute with Parliament in 1641,
brought

down on

themselves

the

wrath

and for

of

Oliver

Cromwell, who arrived in Ireland in 1649, laid to waste the towns
of

Drogheda

impoverished

and Wexford,
west

of

dispatching

Ireland.

One

the
third

native
of

Irish

Irish

to

the

Catholics

perished in the eleven-year war, and after Cromwell's settlements
three-quarters of the land was in
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the hands of the

Protestant

minority.
For Protestants, 1641 had a different significance.
long anticipated an uprising by the native Irish.

They had

Actual events

confirmed their worst fears, and when a number of Protestants were
slaughtered by vengeful Catholics,

it gave rise to the myth of

massacre, and the myth of massacre reinforced the myth of siege.
Insecurity and the fear it bred became a permanent part of the
Protestant mentality.
First there was the fear of being overrun and massacred by the
Catholic majority.

Then came the fear of what would happen if the

Act of Union were repealed.

Later it was the fear of Home Rule.

And finally there has always been the fear of being abandoned by
the

British or

endemic.
Ulster.

sold out

by

their

own.

Protestant

fears

are

They encapsulate the entire Protestant experience in
They are so deeply-rooted, so pervasive, so impervious to

the passage of time that it is almost possible to think of them as
being genetically encoded:

a mechanism,

like anxiety,

necessary

for the survival of the species.
The events of 1688, when the native Catholics again rose up to
support James II,
his

throne

by

the Catholic monarch who had been deposed from

Parliament

in

favor

of

his

brother-in-law,

the

Protestant King William of Orange, affirmed the lessons of 1641.
The

forces

of

James

with

his

French

and

Irish

allies

were

decisively crushed by the armies of William at the Battle of the
Boyne

in

1690,

and

to

this

day,

Protestants

celebrate

the

anniversary of the battle with huge, triumphant marches throughout
Northern Ireland.
For

the

better

part

Protestant Ascendancy ruled.

of

the

next

one

hundred

years,

the

It legislated the penal laws in 1695,

laws that were designed to ensure a permanent Protestant hegemony.
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catholics were banned from public office,
and the army.

They could not vote or own land or teach.

laws were the apartheid of their day,
inferior

the legal professions,

identity,

causing

the

The penal

isolating Catholics in an

percentage

of

land

owned

by

Catholics to fall steadily to 1S-percent by 1703, and to just 7percent by mid-century.
The eighteenth century was the age of the Protestant nation.
In the latter part of it, Protestant nationalism began to emerge in
its own right, which, in the light of subsequent developments, has
a

wry

irony

to

it.

At

issue

was

the

power

of

the

British

government to override legislation passed by the Irish Parliament
(an entirely Protestant body, of course), and the extent to which
it engaged in this practice to ensure that Britain's mercantile
interests were always put before Ireland's.
founded

in 1778 ostensibly to protect

The Irish Volunteers,

Ireland from a

possible

French invasion when British army resources were stretched during
the

war

in

the

American

colonies,

were

in

fact

Ascendancy could deploy to back up its demands

for

an

army

the

legislative

independence.
The threat that Ireland might go the same way as the American
colonies was enough to persuade the British Parliament to grant
independence

in

1782.

The

Act

of

Renunciation

of

British

legislative rights in Ireland declared that there would be two
nations

one

Irish,

one

British,

parliament under a joint crown.

each

with

its

independent

Two kingdoms, one crown.

Throughout the latter part of the eighteenth century, secret
agrarian

societies,

which

tenants

used

to

competition for land, began to proliferate.

control

the

fierce

Competition for land

was particularly intense in Ulster, when several of the penal laws
were repealed and Catholics were allowed to purchase land and hold
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leases on an equal footing with Protestants.

Catholics became more

attractive tenants to landlords since they were used to a lower
standard

of

living

Protestants

were

and

not.

were

prepared

Their

secret

to

pay

higher

societies

rents.

turned

attention from Protestant landlords to Catholic tenants.

their

The "have

littles" fought the "have nots" along strictly sectarian lines.
The paradigm was set.

In the nineteenth century,

rapid influx of new residents,

especially Catholics,

when the

transformed

Belfast from a Presbyterian town of some 19,000 at the turn of the
century to a teeming polyglot of some 400,000 at the century's end,
competition for jobs took the place of competition for land.

The

sectarian riots that have sporadically ravaged the city have their
roots

in

the

agrarian violence

of

the

previous

century.

The

cleavages of the nineteenth century have been reinforced by the
events

of

the

twentieth.

Even

today,

the main

locations

for

sectarian clashes have remained remarkably unchanged since the
riots of the nineteenth century.
In

1 7 91,

largely

by

mandate

from

the

Society of

Presbyterian
the

United

the

Republican

French Revolution

was

Irishmen

formed,

separatists.

It

and began

articulate

to

took

its
a

broad-based form of Irish nationalism that would unite to "end the
English connection,

assert the

independence of the country and

unite the whole people of Ireland."
Its

leader,

Theobold

Wolfe

alliance with the Defenders,

Tone,

attempted

national uprising with the help of the French.
Its significance,

and

however,

as

being the

legitimate

successor.

launch a
was the

the tradition

of physical force to which the Irish Republican Army
itself

an

The uprising in

birth of the Irish republican separatist tradition,
sees

forge

the most effective, well-organized,

and widespread of the Catholic secret societies,
1798 was a dismal failure.

to

(IRA)

The

today

attempted

uprising made the British aware of how vulnerable they were to
24

attack launched through Ireland by their continental enemies.

(The

French nearly landed in Cobh, County Cork and actually landed in
Killalla, County Mayo.)

Accordingly,

in 1800,

abolishing the Irish parliament, was passed.

the Act of Union,

Britain and Ireland

were united in one kingdom with one parliament.
The history of the next one hundred and twenty years is the
history of the attempts to undo the Act of Union,
Ireland its own parliament.
emancipation in 1829,

However,

and to give

the granting of Catholic

which gave Catholics the right to sit in

parliament, ensured that repeal of the Act of Union or Home Rule
(self-rule within a United Kingdom) would have the most deleterious
effect on the status of Irish Protestants:
being

part

parliament

of
to

a

Protestant

being

a

majority

permanent

in

minority

They would go. from
the
in

a

United

Kingdom

Catholic

Irish

parliament.
Twice in the nineteenth century, in 1886 and 1893, the Liberal
Prime Minister, William Gladstone, who needed the support of the
Irish parliamentary party (the Home Rulers) to form his government,
brought Home Rule Bills for Ireland before Parliament, and on both
occasions they went down to defeat.
form of Home Rule was vociferous,

Protestant opposition to any
widespread,

and militant.

In

1912 they formed the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) , an army of some
100,000 men who were prepared to resist Britain with the force of
arms to prevent the implementation of Home Rule.

Nearly half a

million men and women signed the Ulster Covenant, a declaration to
use "all means which may be found necessary to defeat the present
conspiracy to set up a Home Rule parliament in Ireland."

Liberal

Prime Minister Herbert Asquith introduced a third Home Rule bill in
1912

which

passed

its

third

reading

in

January

1913,

implementation was delayed when World War I broke out.
clear, however,

but

its

It was

that Home Rule for the entire island was not on 25

even nationalist leaders were prepared to grant parts of Ulster at
least a temporary exemption.
The

nineteenth

century

was

one

in

which

constitutional movements for Emancipation,
Land Reform, Home Rule flourished.

the

great

mass

Repeal of the Union,

However, a parallel tradition

of the unconstitutional, which held that only physical force could
resolve Ireland's problems, also emerged.
and 1867 were all easily put down.

Uprisings in 1803, 1848,

None of them enjoyed any kind

of popular support nor did the majority of the people subscribe to
what they stood for.
rebellion,

However,

they fed the myths of unending

of ennobling failure.

The failure of the people to

respond to the message of Republicanism became subverted in time by
the larger myth of heroic
English superiori ty.

failure

in the

face of overwhelming

And the distinguishing characteristics of

militant Republicanism began to emerge:

elitism (to a chosen few

fell the task of freeing Ireland; had the men of 1916 waited for an
apathetic nation to catch up to them, there would have been no War
of Independence); suspicion of politics and the democratic will; a
belief in physical force to secure Ireland's independence; a hatred
of England; and separatism.

Moreover, the founding of the secret

Irish Republican Brotherhood
beyond its size.

(IRB)

in 1858 would have an impact

When the Irish Volunteers were founded in 1913

(nationalists were only following in the footsteps of the Unionists
in forming their own "army"),

it was rapidly infiltrated by the

IRB, and when the Volunteers split in 1914, the IRB's control of
the smaller Sinn Fein Volunteers became more pronounced.

(The

National Volunteers supported enlisting in the Bri tish army in
support of World War Ii Sinn Fein Volunteers opposed enlistment.)
The Easter Rising of 1916 was mythic.
small cabal

in the

IRS,

itself a small

Volunteers, it was designed to fail,
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Planned in secret by a
cabal

in the Sinn Fein

to be a blood sacrifice that

would redeem the Irish nation and arouse it to action.
Patrick Pearse,

a group of about 1,400 Volunteers took over the

General Post Office
buildings

in

Led by

(GPO)

Dublin

and several other strategically placed

and

proclaimed

the

establishment

provisional Republic on behalf of the Irish people.

of

a

Ill-prepared,

ill-equipped, without any apparent plan of action, they were more
like the occupants of a besieged garrison, ready to resist assault
rather than representing the vanguard of a national uprising.
In less than a week of fighting, 220 civilians, 64 volunteers,
and 134 British soldiers were killed.

When Pearse surrendered, the

Volunteers were jeered and spit upon by the people of Dublin as
they were led away.

But when the fifteen leaders of the uprising,

including the seven signatories of the Proclamation, were summarily
executed over a nine-day period between 3 May and 12 May,
public mood was transformed.

the

Outrage at the Volunteers turned to

outrage at the authorities, and those who had been executed became
martyr-heroes.

"Every student of the Uprising,

reluctantly or

otherwise, has reached the conclusion that it was a cardinal event,
a cardo rerum, a hinge or turning point of fortune, after which all
recourse to Home Rule on the part of the English government became
impossible,"

the

historian

George

Dangerfield

writes

in

The

Damnable Question.
"This did not dawn all at once.
for

the rebels,

then as

It appeared first as sympathy

a martyrology;

then as

a

growing

rej ection of the sober promises of constitutionalism.
Home

Rule

been

constitutional

accepted

path

by

would

the

have

Tories

led

in

in

the

1912,
long

Had
this

run

to

independence without partition ... The great political effect of
the Uprising was

that

it generated impatience in a

generation."
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The public expressed its impatience in a more forceful way in
the 1918 general election when it gave its overwhelming support to
Sinn Fein.

The party,

founded by Arthur Griffith in 1905,

had

become an alternative option, if only by virtue of its existence,
for all those, radical or conservative, who were disillusioned with
the National Party (former Home Rulers).

The repudiation of the

National Party, the voice of constitutional nationalism that had
represented nationalists in the Westminster Parliament in one form
or another since 1873 for failing to deliver Home Rule, paved the
way for

the War of

Independence,

spearheaded by the Sinn Fein

Volunteers, now the Irish Republican Army, under the leadership of
Michael Collins, between 1919 and 1921.
In

1920,

the

British government

passed

the

Government

of

Ireland Act, creating two Irish states within the framework of the
United Kingdom:

a Northern state composed of six counties that

would ensure a permanent Protestant majority, and a Southern state
of twenty-six counties.

However, this arrangement was superseded

by the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921,

which created the Irish Free

State,

its

an

independent

country

in

own

right,

albeit

with

dominion status, with its own parliament, and the Northern Ireland
state, with its own parliament as well as continued representation
in

the Westminster parliament,

which would remain part of the

United Kingdom.
The IRA split over the treaty - some wanting to hold out for
the Republic they had sought, others arguing that the treaty gave
"the freedom to win the freedom," in Michael Collins's memorable
phrase, and that the Boundary Commission established by the Treaty
would redraw the border in such a way as to make Northern Ireland
economically unviable.

A bitter civil war followed in 1922 and

1923, pitting the Irish Free State army,
members of the IRA,

largely made up of former

against their erstwhile comrades,
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before the

"Irregulars" accepted that they could not prevail.
Most of those on the losing side in the civil war put aside
their arms,

formed

the

Fianna Fail party in

1926,

and entered

constitutional politics under the leadership of Eamon de Valera.
A few remained in Sinn Fein and gave their allegiance to what was
left of the IRA,

to the Proclamation of the Republic in 1916, to

the historically ordained mandate for a united Ireland.

For them,

the

with

establishment

of

the

Irish

Free

State

in

1922,

Dominion status and the Oath of Allegiance to the Crown,

its

was an

illegal act, and all subsequent Dublin governments were, therefore,
illegal.

(The Provisional IRA did not abandon this policy until

the mid-1980s).

The IRA,

they held, was the true political and

military heir to the 1918 parliament.

They did not accept the

right of the minority created at the time of the plantation of
Ulster to secede from the nation.

(The Unionists used the same

reasoning to argue that the Irish Free State did not have the right
to secede from the Union, that the nationalists were,

in fact, the

real secessionists.)
When De Valera himself assumed power in Dublin in 1932, he
proscribed the IRA.

During the next thirty years the IRA made

periodic attempts at mounting bombing campaigns in Britain and
armed attacks on military and police installations in the North.
Its most sustained effort was the Border Campaign of 1956-62.

The

movement enjoyed little popular support and was totally surprised
when Northern Ireland finally erupted in 1968.

In The Provisional

IRA, authors Patrick Bishop and Eamonn Mallie estimate that there
were perhaps fewer than sixty men in Belfast in 1969 who would have
regarded themselves as being members of the IRA, and at least half
of them had lapsed.
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Irish nationalists - Catholics for the most part - maintain
that the partition of Ireland in 1920 was contrary to the wishes of
a great majority of Irish people and that Northern Ireland was an
artificially created entity, its borders drawn to maximize an area
that would ensure

permanent

Protestant

hegemony.

The

Bri tish

maintain that Home Rule would have resulted in civil war.

One

million Unionists - Protestants for the most part - concentrated in
the

northeast

of

Ireland,

who

thought

of

themselves

as

being

British, would have gone from being members of a majority in the UK
to being a minority in an all-Ireland Catholic state.

They had not

only the intention but the capacity to resist any attempt to impose
Home

Rule.

therefore:

"Home

Rule

was

Rome

Rule."

Bri tain' s

solution

Partition Ireland into two separate political unjts,

one of which with its Protestant majority would remain within the
UK.
And thus the irony:
no one wanted it.

Northern Ireland came into being because

Protestants did not want it.

They sought only

to preserve the union of Ireland and Britain; Catholics did not
want it since the new arrangements prevented one-third of Ireland's
population
Catholics

who

were

Catholic

in the North never gave

Northern Ireland state.
to the South.
pits

the

from

expressing

their allegiance

than

identity.
to

the new

Instead they proclaimed their allegiance

At its most basic level,

fewer

their

one million

therefore,

Protestants,

who

the conflict
believe

the

maintenance of the Union with Great Britain is the only way to
preserve

their

future,

against

the

just over one-half million

Catholics, who believe they will be secure only within some form of
a united Ireland.
NORTHERN IRELAND: THE UNIONIST STATE
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·.Even

though

they

formed

a

permanent majori ty

Northern Ireland state, Protestants felt besieged,

in

the

new

from within by

the recalcitrant Catholic minority and from wi thout by the new
state to the South that laid claim in its constitution to Northern
Ireland as part of its national territory.

The Unionist government

established a special paramilitary police force,

the "B Specials,"

in 1920 to protect the state against the assaults of Republicans,
and

introduced

a

Special

Powers

Act

in

1922

that

gave

the

government draconian powers to arrest and intern people without due
process °

The Unionists concentrated all power in their own hands,

and being a permanent majority they never had to relinquish it or
share it with Catholics.
Increasingly,

Protestants

came

to

see

all

Catholics

as

subversives and to interpret all Catholic actions in that light.
Any compromise with Catholics in anything remotely political - and
almost

everything

hegemony.

The

was

was

result

was

seen

as

widespread

undermining

Protestant

discrimination

against

Catholics, especially in housing and jobs; a concentrated effort to
keep

their

numbers

down

by

keeping

their

emigration

stereotyping;

gerrymandering with the electoral process

local

and

level;

a

society

that

put

the

utmost

at

premium

up;
the
on

geographic divisions and that used religion as a badge of political
allegiance to the point where one of its prime ministers was to
assert that "we are a Prot-estant state for a Protestant people."
Ever since the 1920s,
been reflexive:

Protestant response to partition has

Behind every Catholic demand was the attempt to

destroy the Northern Ireland state.

Accordingly, when middle-class

Catholics organized a civil-rights movement
modelled,

in the late

1960s,

in large measure on the civil rights movement in the

United States,

demanding impartial police protection,

electoral abuses, equal employment opportunities,
31

...•..
~,;~

;,...

.0

an end to

fair allocation

of

public

housing,

and

the

disbanding

of

the

"B

Specials,"

Protestants responded in the way they were conditioned to:
violence

to

thwart

the

perceived

threat

since

any

with

organized

Catholic action was thought by many to be an act of subversion to
bring about a united Ireland.

When the police could no longer

control the situation, the British government deployed British army
troops on the streets of Northern Ireland in August 1969 to protect
the Catholic communi ty,

and the beleaguered Catholic communi ty

received them with open arms.
By 1970,

the civil rights movement had achieved its major

objectives, but the army's presence had become the symbol of old
hatreds -

a symbol that at last provided a renascent IRA with a

situation to exploit.
hundred members,

six

By mid 1970, the Provisional IRA had fifteen
hundred

of

whom were

believed

to

be

in

Belfast.
In the South,

from the 1920s, partition was treated only in

the context of a continued British occupation of the Six Counties.
There was no disagreement among the political parties in the South
on

this

issue;

thus

their

policies

were

non-policies,

simply

calling for an end to the British occupation, and hence for an end
to partition.

By insisting that a foreign occupation was the only

thing precluding unification,
having to
consider

discuss

the political parties were spared

the question of Northern

alternative

possibilities,

having

Ireland,
to

having to

examine

their

assumptions about Irish nationalism, having to define the nature of
political consent, having to develop the processes to achieve it,
and, most important, perhaps, to understand the nature of Unionism
and the identity of Northern Protestantism.

Partition encouraged

the confessional ethos of

the state.

asserted its independence,

the more it asserted its Catholicism;

and, with it,

its Gaelicism,

The more the

Free State

eventually leading one of its prime
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ministers to assert that "we are a Catholic nation."
By

the

middle

of

1972

violence

in

escalating at an unprecedented rate.

Northern

Ireland

was

The IRA responded to the

British government's introduction of internment without trail in
August 1971 with a military campaign of unparalleled ferocity.

In

the seven months prior to the introduction of internment, eleven
soldiers

and

seventeen

civilians

died.

In

the

five

months

following internment thirty-two British soldiers, five members of
the Ulster Defense Regiment (UDR) , and ninety-seven civilians were
either shot dead or blown to bits.

On Bloody Sunday - 30 January

1972

shot

British army paratroopers

during

a

civil

murderous

rights

response

rally

by the

in Derry,

IRA in

the

dead

fourteen

provoking
form of

civilians

an

an

even lUore

unrestrained

all-out bombing campaign.
The bombing of the Abercon restaurant in downtown Belfast on
a Saturday afternoon in early March, when it was sure to be crowded
wi th shoppers,

left two dead and nineteen inj ured.

Weeks later

massive car bombs in Lower Donegal Street killed two civilians and
two

policemen,

leaving

handicapped for

life.

many

of

the

190

seriously

Car bombs and the

injured

or

threat of car bombs

immobilized Derry and Belfast, stretching the security forces to
breaking point.
In April

1972,

the

British

government

abolished

Northern

Ireland's parliament and established Direct Rule from Westminster
under the aegis of a Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.

Like

so many things that were supposed to be temporary, Direct Rule has
become a seemingly permanent part of Northern Ireland's political
landscape,
history

of

and the history of the last twenty-five years is the
the

various

attempts

to

find

new

structures

of

government acceptable to both communities that would replace Direct
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The IRA, perhaps with some sense that it could force the next
step - British withdrawal -

reached for the pinnacle of excess.

During April and May 1972, sixteen British soldiers were killed.
In

May

there

explosions.

were
And

1,223

in the

shooting
first

incidents

three weeks of

and
June

ninety-four
the

army's

casualties - nineteen dead and several dozen injured - were worse
than

in any complete

month

since

its

troops

were

deployed in

Northern Ireland.
BRITISH POLICY
During the late 1960s, the 1970s, and the early 1980s, British
government policy in the North vacillated between blunt assertions
that Northern Ireland was part of the UK, and as such the conflict
there was an internal matter for the UK to resolve,

to attempts

encouraging powersharing between the two communities in the North
and recognition of an Irish Dimension, to the Anglo-Irish agreement
of 1985 which explicitly acknowledged that the Irish government had
legitimate rights and interests in Northern Ireland which would
have to be accommodated in any settlement, an acknowledgement that
was reiterated more strongly in the Downing Street Declaration in
December

1993.

Whatever

were/are envisaged,

forms

of

new

governance

arrangements

Britain has been adamant on one point:

the

consti tutional status of Northern Ireland will not change until
that

is

the

wish

of a

majority of

the

people

living

there.

Moreover, all the political parties in the South, and the SDLP, the
party which represents at least two-thirds of Catholics

in the

North, subscribe to this proviso.
However, Britain continues to elicit distrust on both sides of

34

the divide,

as

it

seeks

to

appease

two

diametrically opposing aspirations.

conununities

that

have

On the one hand, it seeks to

convey the impression that Northern Ireland is an integral part of
the UK; on the other, that it would not stand in the way of some
form of

association with

course,

formulate

a

the

policy

rest of

to

Ireland.

acconunodate

It cannot,

both

ends,

and

of
its

attempts to do so only highlight the underlying incongruities and
magnify the distrust.
Having no

long-term objectives,

or

at

least

not

publicly

stated ones, she is attempting to achieve short-term objectives or
to

develop

a

set

of

complementary aspects

complementary
of

the

confusion and contradiction,

strategies

conflict.

The

to

deal

result

is

with

on~

of

with both conununities scrutinizing

every government statement for nuances that might make it appear
that

the

government

is

leaning

to

its

side.

The

British

Government's insistence that it is an honest broker and that the
ingredients

of

a

settlement

must

be

worked

out

by

the

two

communities adds to the recipe for conflict.
Moreover, claims of neutrality lead the SDLP to argue that the
task of nationalists is to persuade Britain to become one of the
persuaders, that is, to convince unionists to become part of some
form of an all-Ireland state.
that the

One could argue, with equal logic,

task of the unionists is also to persuade Britain to

become one of the persuaders,

that is,

to convince nationalists

that their future lies in some form of a Northern Ireland state
which is part of the United Kingdom.
Britain mayor may not want Northern Ireland to remain in the
U.K.

It

is

inconceivable,

however,

that

the

U.K.,

given

the

practices of international law, would unilaterally "rid" itself of
Northern Ireland without the consent of a majority of the people of
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the region,

more especially so in the post-Cold War world where

ethnic conflicts and disputes over national territory are resulting
in violent upheavals across Europe.
The concept of the consent of a majority is a necessary but
not a

sufficient condition

constitutional status.
it promises.

for

a

change

in Northern

Ireland's

Simple majority consent cannot deliver what

It is regressive since it increases uncertainty about

the future of Northern Ireland.
Even

if Catholics were

electorate

at

some

future

to

emerge

stage,

as

the majority of

the consent

formula

the

would be

inoperable without the consent of a sufficiently large numbeF of
Protestants

to

forestall

a

Protestant

backlash

against

forced

incorporation into an all-Ireland state, in which they would have
had no say in how that state was shaped (a "unitary state", the New
Ireland Forum's preferred option, being a non-starter).

Moreover,

Protestants are more determinedly against a united Ireland than
Catholics are for it.

There is little support among Protestants

for any form of a united Ireland.

Most Protestants are not even

prepared to see it as a future option.

On the other hand, there is

far less complete support among Catholics for a united Ireland than
imagined.

As

acceptance.

a

long-term

However,

objective

it

receives

widespread

in only one of the vast number of surveys

carried out in Northern l;reland did Catholics opt for a united
Ireland of some form as their preferred option.

Usually a united

Ireland is a less favored option than power sharing with a devolved
government and an Irish dimension:

a differentiaion between the

acceptable and the aspirational.
Moreover, even supposing a majority for Irish unity did emerge
and some

form of all-Ireland state came into being,

majority of the Northern Ireland electorate,
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what if a

having experienced

life in a

unified Ireland with its

lower living standards and

less-developed welfa.£,e system, wanted to reverse its decision?

And

what if the electorate in the Republic, where polls consistently
show that the South has little wish to acquire a North that will
put an added squeeze on

their already scarce

resources,

voted

against incorporating Northern Ireland into an all-Ireland state,
given the complete restructuring of the Irish polity that would
require?
The concept of majority consent is an illusion in the context
of Northern Ireland's constitutional status.
a tool on which to build policy.

It is not useful as

This is in fact recognized by

both the Social Democratic and Labour Party, which
majority of Northern Catholics,

represent~

and the Irish Government.

the

SDLP

leader John Hume:
Differences

should be

respected and

insti tutions

created,

North and South, which clearly respect our diversity and our
difference, but which also allow us to work the substantial
common ground between all of us and through that process of
working

together, as happened in Europe,

to break down the

barriers of prejudice and distrust over a few generations, and
evolve into a genuine New Ireland where a unity,
Europe,

is based on diversity and born of agreement,

mutual respect.

The

keep

that

giving

is

answer
our

they

approach,

[the

group of people could unite

agreement?

Provisional

because

agreement, gives a veto to the Unionists.
how a

similar to

about

we

and
IRA]

insist

on

Could they tell us
anything without

(The Irish Times, 25/11/93)

Said then Taoiseach (Prime Minister) and leader of the Fianna
Fail party Albert Reynolds:
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'The Fianna Fail party is committedO a~ · ;'~~rjof

' 0" o~

. "
its principal
"

-' " ,:

aims t~ the eventual establishment of .~ united Ireland, but
recognizes that realistically it can only come about through
agreement and consent, and as a result of a lengthy process of
dialogue,

cooperation and reconciliation.

(Financial Times,

23/4/'93)
The Tanaiste (Deputy Prime Minister) and Foreign Minister, Mr.
Dick Spring, said at the meeting of the Irish Association in the
Mansion House, Dublin, on 5 March 1993:
We

are

working

towards

an

accommodation

between

the

two

traditions in Ireland, based on the principle that both must
have

satisfactory,

secure,

and

durable

poli tical,

administrative, and symbolic expression and protection.
could agree on certain

We

fundamental principles to govern all

future relationships and entrench them beyond the reach of all
changes in regard to sovereignty. There are possibilities here
which far transcend the issue of Articles 2 and 3.

[In the

Irish Constitution, these articles claim Northern Ireland to
be part of Ireland's national territory.]

( The Irish Times,

6/3/'93)
Since June 1974 British opinion has consistently come down on
the side of British military withdrawal.

There has also been a

consistent consensus for ending the Union.

Ulster Protestants may

see themselves as British;

the

feeling,

reciprocated by the mainland British.

however,

clearly isn't

The lack of British concern

with Northern Ireland is not surprising.

It accounts for less than

3 percent of the UK's population and for just 17 of the 651 Members
of the House of Commons and since Northern Ireland MPs are not
members of Britain's Labour,

Conservative or Liberal Democratic
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parties, they never become part of the government structure.
conflict

in

Ireland

is

seen

as

intransigence and bullheadedness.

being

the

resul t

of

The

"Paddy"

"Paddy," much to the chagrin of

Northern Protestants, includes them, too.
The first White Paper on Northern Ireland's constitutional
future appeared in March 1973.
member

Assembly

representation.

for

Northern

The

running of Northern

It proposed a new seventy-eight
Ireland

Assembly
Ireland,

control over security.

would

elected
take

by

over

proportional

the

day-to-day

al though Westminster would retain

The White Paper also advanced the idea of

power sharing to guarantee minority representation in government.
Elections for the new Assembly were held in June,
five months of wrangling,

the SDLP,

1973 and after

the Unionist Party and the

Alliance Party agreed to form a power-sharing Executive.

Within a

month the three parties met with the British and Irish governments
at Sunningdale to work out the political framework in which it
would

operate.

The

Irish

government,

for

the

first

time,

recognized the de jure existence of Northern Ireland when it agreed
to the stipulation that a change in the constitutional status of
Northern Ireland would require the consent of the majority of its
population.

For its part, the British government said it would not

stand in the way of a united Ireland, if such consent did emerge,
and

the

Northern

Westminster,

agreed

Ireland
to

a

Executive,

Council

of

under
Ireland

pressure
(shades

of

from
the

Government of Ireland Act of 1920) to give institutional expression
to the Irish Dimension.
The arrangements were short-lived.

Rather than face down the

militant Ulster Workers' strike called in May 1974 to protest the
proposed Council of Ireland, the newly-elected Labour government,
dependent for its survival on a slender margin stood aside,
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thus

ensuring

the

collapse

of

the

Sunningdale

Agreement

and

the

experiment in powersharing.
For the next ten years, "initiatives" were for the most part
exercises in form.

The impasse was simple and complete.

On the

Protestant side, no powersharing and no Irish Dimension.

On the

Catholic side, powersharing and an Irish Dimension.

On the British

side, no propensity to wield "the stick."
THE DOUBLE MINORITY SYNDROME

There are two psychological perceptions of siege that collide
with each other.
as

Catholics use the framework of Northern

their terms of reference.

minority

of

one-third

or

There

Ire~and

they see themselves

thereabouts

of

the

as a

population.

Protestants use Ireland as a whole as their terms of reference.
Here they see themselves as a minority of twenty percent.

Hence

both communities see themselves as the aggrieved party, both see
themselves as victims, both exhibit the attitudes and passivity
that are characteristics of victimization, both see themselves in
zero-sum situations.
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There are two sets of perspectives:
THE PROTESTANT PERSPECTIVE IS ESSENTIALLY RELIGIOUS.

THE CATHOLIC PERSPECTIVE IS ESSENTIALLY POLITICAL.

Protestants fear Catholicism and absorption by what they see
as a Catholic state on their frontier.

However, there are distinct

differences among Protestants regarding the question of allegiance.
The Anglo-Protestants want above all else to remain part of the
U.K.; scots-Presbyterians want above all else not to become part of

an all-Ireland state.
Many Protestants fear cultural and religious absorption in a
theocracy.

The ne temere decree required the non-Catholic partner

in a mixed marriage to give a written undertaking to raise the
children of that marriage as Catholics.

This was one of the main

reasons why the Protestant population of the South fell from 11percent in 1921 to less than 2-percent today.
as having disappeared.
fears

in

Northern

They see themselves

They are beginning to express the same

Ireland.

They point

to

the

fact

that

the

population of Belfast is beginning to become increasingly Catholic.
In fact,
years.

the City Council will be dominated by Sinn Fein in a few
Twenty years ago the population of the Shankill was 76,000;

today it is 27,000.

The Protestant population of North Belfast has

fallen from 112,000 in 1982 to 56,000 today.

Protestants feel they

are in retreat; they see Catholics as being on the ascendent.
Catholics want more political power in Northern Ireland, and
some form of association with the rest of Ireland.
There are two sets of identity, which often express themselves
41

in terms of conflicting

opposites.
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THE CATHOLIC IDENTITY IS IRISH.

THE PROTESTANT IDENTITY IS BRITISH.
Many Protestants, who call themselves Loyalist, have a strong
anti-English streak; they regard themselves as British only in the
generalized cultural definition of the term.

They are much less

secure in their political identity, and they compensate for that by
having a much stronger sense of their religious identity.

What

loyalism represents is opposition to any move to absorb Ulster into
a

united

Ireland.

Allegiance

to

Britain

is,

there fore,

conditional, and to this extent the term Loyalism is a misnomer.
The conditional element of the link to Britain accounts in
part for the ambivalence Northern Ireland Protestants have about
their identity.

Since Protestants are unsure of their Britishness,

and given the fact that being British is not a primary national
identity but
person

a

would

supplementary one
immediately

(no Scot or English or Welsh

identity

himself/herself

as

being

British), Protestants are a lot more sure of what they are not than
of what they are.

And because they are more unsure than Ulster

Catholics

their

of

what

political

identity

is,

they

are

more

insecure about it and tend to compensate by feeling more strongly
about it.

And because they do not have a strong sense of political

identity, they fall back on their religion for symbols of identity.
And because

they

take

their

cue

in

religious

matters

from

an

anti-Catholicism bias that is common to all their denominations
(there

are

at

least

55

different

sects

in

Northern

Ireland),

anti-Catholicism becomes an expression of a shared identity.
THE HUNGER STRIKES 1980/1981
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By the mid 1970s, an explosive issue was coming to a head in
the Maze/Long Kesh prison.

In June 1972, prisoners convicted of

"political" offenses were treated to what, in their view, amounted
to prisoner-of-war status:

Prisoners were not required to wear

prison uniforms or to work, they were housed in compounds, and they
were allowed other privileges.
But the situation changed in 1976.

Under the new policy,

persons convicted of "political" crimes were treated as ordinary
criminals.
repulsive.

They

would

have

to

wear

prison

disgusting,

and

And it didn't work.

The prisoners decided to force the issue.

Hence the f,irst

hunger strike in October 1980 when seven prisoners vowed to fast to
their deaths until their demands for special status were met.
strike lasted fifty-three days,

ending on

18

The

December when it

appeared that both sides had agreed to mutually acceptable terms.
When this proved not to be the case, Bobby Sands began a second
hunger strike on 1 March 1981.
the

following

three

He died sixty-six days later.

months,

nine

others

followed

in

In
his

death-steps.
The hunger strikes allowed the IRA to reestablish itself in
the heroic mold and to reaffirm its legitimacy in a historical
contest,

making

it more

difficult

to

dismiss

the

IRA as

mere

terrorists representing a few.
Moreover,

the

fact

Westminster parliament
valuable lessons:
a

particular

that

while

Bobby
in

Sands

jail

was

taught

elected

the

to

IRA/Sinn

the
Fein

that the mobilization of public opinion around

issue

was

a

powerful

propaganda

tool;

that

the

contesting of elections provided a base upon which to build an
endur ing

pol i tical

organi za tion.
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Tha t

autumn

Sinn

Fein

(the

poli tical wing of the IRA)

tested the electoral waters when it

contested province-wide elections for one more National Assembly,
this one based on the concept of "rolling devolution."
THE NEW IRELAND FORUM (1983/1984)

The support for Sinn Fein in the 1982 Assembly elections (they
received almost one-third of the Catholic vote) made a mockery of
Dublin's claim that the IRA had no substantial base in Northern
Ireland.

To meet the challenge Sinn Fein's performance posed, the

four major constitutional Nationalist parties on the island Fianna
Fail, Fine Gael, and the Labour Party from the South, and the SDLP
from the North came together in the New Ireland Forum in May 1983
to hammer out their vision of a New Ireland.
parties

represented

the

ninety

percent

Among them these

of

the

Nationalist

electorate who disassociated themselves from the IRA's campaign of
violence.

The Forum had two goals:

a poli tical obj ecti ve to

contain Sinn Fein and a policy objective to set forth the common
agenda of Nationalists

for

achieving a

New

Ireland that would

provide a clear and unambiguous alternative to armed struggle.
After eleven months of deliberations,

twenty-eight private

sessions, thirteen public sessions and fifty-six meetings of the
four party leaders, the New Ireland Forum issued a report of its
findings in May 1984.
problem,

After briefly setting out the origins of the

the report harshly criticized British policy since 1969

for being one of "crisis management."

The heart of the problem, it

argued, was Britain's failure to provide the Nationalist population
of

the

North

with

any

constructive

means

of

expressing

its

nationalism and its aspirations, thereby undermining constitutional
poli tics.

Having set out what it called a "Framework for a New

Ireland:

Present Realities and Future Requirements," the report
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addressed the question of options:

"The particular structure of

political unity which the Forum [would wish] to see established is
a unitary state, achieved by agreement and consent, embracing the
whole island of Ireland and providing irrevocable guarantees for
the

protection

and

preservation

Nationalist identities."
would be

drawn up

"at

A new,

of

both

the

Unionist

and

nondenominational constitution

an all-around constitutional

conference

convened by the British and Irish Governments."
In addition to the unitary state model, the Forum examined two
other constitutional proposals:
and one for joint authority.

one for a federal/confederal state
Under joint authority,

and Dublin governments would have equal

responsibili ty for, all

aspects of the government of Northern Ireland,"
"equal

validity

Finally,

to

the

two

traditions

"the London

in

thus according

Northern

Ireland."

the Forum said that it remained "open to discuss other

views which [might] contribute to political development."
TALKS (1) 1984/1985

Meanwhile, however, the real dialogue was taking place out of
public

view.

In

November

1983,

Irish

Prime

Minister

Garret

FitzGerald and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher held their
second summit meeting at Chequers,
country estate.

the Bri tish Prime Minister's

FitzGerald made the argument to Thatcher that

alienation in the minority Catholic community in Northern Ireland
had reached such a high level that unless measures were taken to
alleviate

it,

there

constitutional politics

would

be

serious

in Northern Ireland.

consequences
Specifically,

for
he

referred to the support that Sinn Fein had elicited in the British
general election in June 1983 when Sinn Fein received forty-three
percent of the Nationalist vote in Northern Ireland.
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He argued

that

if that vote got any higher,

it could signal

the end of

constitutional politics in Northern Ireland, that if this were to
happen

the

consequences

would

spillover

into

the

South

and

possibly destabilize constitutional politics there, and that that,
in turn, would have serious consequences for Britain.
Informal talks got under way in March 1984, and formal talks
began one year later, in March 1985.

Despite the lack of success

of attempted political initiatives throughout the seventies and
early eighties, the political formula for an agreement was already
in place.

Successive Irish governments accepted that the status of

Northern Ireland would not change without the consent of a majority
of

the

people

there,

while

successive

British

governments

acknowledged that an Irish Dimension existed, and that a devolved
government

would

have

to

have

the

support

of

the

Na tionalist

community.
In two

crucial

respects,

however,

the

capacities

governments, but especially the British government,

of both

to translate

good intentions into political actions were severely circumscribed
by the entrenched, unmovable positions of their respective clients.
The Unionists, secure in their constitutional position under
the Northern Ireland Constitution Act (1973) and tenacious in their
belief that their numbers alone precluded them from being coerced
into any form of devolved government

that did not

countenance

majority rule, or any North-South relationship that involved more
than mere

"neighborliness,"

were

in

a

posi tion

to

veto

every

proposal.

Moreover, since their position on an Irish Dimension was

absolute,

the

coupling of

devolution

that

would

require

their

making concessions on the sharing of power with the SDLP and an
Irish Dimension that would involve their making concessions to the
South made any progress on devolution impossible.
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On the Nationalist side, the refusal of the SDLP to enter into
any discussion of devolution without a prior undertaking that an
Irish Dimension was an issue of at least equal standing gave it,
too, a veto power that led to paralysis.

Accordingly, the British

government's power to move the political parties in the North in
the direction of an accommodation was severely curtailed.
a

zero-sum game:

Unionists

was

Nationalists,
acceptable

to

anything
a

and

that

appeared

sufficient

reason

conversely,

anything

Nationalists

was

a

to

for

be
its

that

It was

acceptable

to

rej ection

by

appeared

sufficient

to

reason

for

be
its

rejection by Unionists.
The Anglo-Irish process, initiated in May 1980 by Irish Prime
Minister

Charles

Haughey

and

Bri tish

Prime

Minister

Margaret

Thatcher, had resulted in a series of summit meetings in December
1980, November 1981, and November 1983 between the prime ministers
of both countries.
establish

an

institutional

In November 1981, both governments agreed to

Anglo-Irish

Intergovernmental

expression

"to

the

unique

relationship between the two countries."
regular basis.

Council

to

character

give

of

the

The Council met on a

Indeed, in one eighteen-month period, November 1983

to March 1985, it met on no less than thirty occasions.

In short,

the basis was laid for an institutional framework within which the
Irish

and

British

governments

could

accommodate

their

mutual

interests and debate their often not-inconsiderable differences on
a

whole

range

of

matters,

including

Northern

Ireland.

Such

institutional relationships, it was clear, were not subject to the
veto powers of the Northern parties.
therefore,

was the

first

step

The Anglo-Irish process,

in shifting the

framework

for a

political initiative out of the narrow confines of Northern Ireland
and

making

it

the

shared

responsibility of

governments.
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the

two

sovereign

THE ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT (AlA) 1985

The summit held at Hillsborough Castle,
November

1985,

at

which

then

Bri tish

County Down,

Prime

on 15

Minister Margaret

Thatcher and her then Irish counterpart, Garret FitzGerald, affixed
their signatures to the Anglo-Irish Agreement, was,
the

communique

which

followed

it,

"the

third

according to

meeting

of

the

Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council to be held at the level of
Heads of State."
The Agreement,
Parliament]

which was

ratified by Dail

on 21 November by 88 votes

to

Eireann

[Irish

75 by the House of

Commons on 27 November by 473 to 47, and registered under Art:icle
102

of

the

Charter

of

the

United

Nations

on

20

December,

effectively gave Dublin a consultative role in how Northern Ireland
is governed.
It

is

succinct,

its

brevity

almost

concealing

the

craftsmanship that went into its wording.
First, both governments affirmed that any change in the status
of Northern Ireland would come about only with the consent of a
majority of the people of Northern

Ireland.

Both governments

recognized that at present the Unionist majori ty wished for no
change in its status.

And both governments promised to introduce

and support in their respective parliaments legislation to secure
a united Ireland if in the future a majority of the people in
Northern Ireland were clearly to wish for and formally consent to
the establishment of a united Ireland.
Second,

the

two

governments

agreed

to

set

up

an

Intergovernmental Conference that would be jointly chaired by the
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British Secretary of State for Northern Ireland,

currently Sir

Patrick Mayhew, and a "Permanent Irish Ministerial Representative,"
at present the Minister for Foreign Affairs,

Dick Spring.

The

functions of the Conference would pertain both to Northern Ireland
and the Republic of Ireland, specifically with regard to political
matters, security arrangements, the administration of justice, and
the promotion of cross-border cooperation.

A provision specifying

that "determined efforts shall be made through the Conference to
resolve any differences" a binding legal obligation with precedent
in international law seemed to suggest that the Irish government's
role was more than merely consultative.
Third, both London and Dublin support the idea of a devolved
government,

dealing

with

a

range

of

matters

within

Northern

Ireland, that would command "widespread acceptance throughout the
community."

Should this occur, Dublin would, nevertheless, retain

a say in certain areas affecting the interests of the Nationalist
minority

(such as security arrangements and human rights).

If

devolution did not come to pass, then Dublin would continue to have
a

say in all matters that affect Nationalists.

Finally,

after

three years, the workings of the Conference would be reviewed "to
see if any changes in the scope and nature of its activities are
desirable."
Thus

the

priorities:

logic of
First,

the Agreement

work out

the

and

the

ordering of

relationship between

the

the
two

governments on a government-to-government basis; develop a set of
institutional arrangements not susceptible to the shifting vagaries
of political actions in the North; and then look for an internal
settlement within Northern Ireland.
Unionist
inducement

opposition
the

to

Agreement

the

And thus,

Agreement

provides

anticipated,

encourage

the

Unionists

to

negotiate an acceptable form of devolution with Nationalists.

On
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to

was

since widespread

been subliminal in some ways but very noticeable in other ways, the
feeling that the Catholic position has finally been recognized, and
had to be dealt with; the fact that it gave a permanent presence in
the

North

of

Ireland

to

the

Irish

government

through

the

Secretariat.
THE

AlA:

Ultimately, of course,

HOW EFFECTIVE?
the Hillsborough Agreement should be

judged on the extent to which it achieves its avowed aims, that is,
the extent to which it promotes peace and stability in Northern
Ireland

and

helps

communities,
traditions.

to

reconcile

the

Protestant

and

Catholic

with their divergent but

legitimate

interests and

The notion that these aims could be achieved, however,

was the product of explicit and implicit assumptions on the part of
both

Dublin

and

London,

assumptions

that

were,

perhaps,

not

entirely tenable.
The explicit assumption was that if the alienation in the
Catholic community in Northern Ireland, the result most immediately
of

the

British

government's

security

administration of the judicial system

policies

and

its

went beyond a certain point,

the adverse consequences for constitutional politics on the island
as a whole would be not only serious but potentially irreversible.
The

implicit

widespread

assumption

opposition

in

was

that

even

the

Protestant

agreement the two governments came to,
bene fits of such an agreement,

if

there

communi ty

was
to

initial
whatever

it would subside when the

in the form of a lower level of

violence and the formal international guarantee of the Unionists'
constitutional
Protestants.

position,

became

apparent

to

a

majority

of

In sum, according to the logic that prevailed,

the

existing level of alienation in the Catholic community was such as
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by the IRA, that the Agreement has facilitated and encouraged the
IRA.

In the early 1990s, Loyalist paramilitaries began to engage

again in the random assassination of Catholics and the divisions
between the two communities remain as great as ever.

TALKS (2)

In

1991

parties,

and

after

again

in

years

1991/1992

1992

of

the

constitutional

wrangling

over

political

procedure

and

micro-examining the nuances of difference between the suspension of
the Agreement and merely declaring it to be inactive,
consti tutional
governments

parties

agreed to

in
a

the

North and

formula

for

the

the

British and

conducting

talks

at

four
Irish
three

different levels (Strand One involving the parties in the North and
the

British

governance;

government

Strand Two

concerning

structures

involving parties

in

for

the

North

internal
and the

British and Irish governments concerning the form and expression of
the

association between the

involving

the

British

and

North

and the

South;

Irish

governments

expression to whatever emerges from Strand One

to

Strand Three
give

formal

and Strand Two.)

In this regard, when there is a transparent absence of trust
on each side of the divide, a negotiating process and practices on
the basis that nothing is agreed until everything is agreed sets up
a situation more like a poker
table than a negotiating table.

Rather than encouraging openness

and risk-taking, it encourages both sides to play their cards close
to the chest and certainly cannot provide the ambience in which
accommodation emerges.
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At each level, negotiation should involve the inherent risk of
compromise, each compromise is a building block, and as the parties
grow to trust each other as they move from one compromise to the
next, with concessions, though difficult, to make apparent on all
sides, each party becomes invested in the process, each develops a
stake in seeing the other succeed,

the sum of mutual investment

develops which provides the cushion when it comes to the crunch
issues.
One problem, of course, that compounded the difficulties the
political parties faced was their opposing perceptions as to what
the negotiating process was all about.

The Unionist parties wished

to negotiate an agreement to replace the Anglo-Irish Agreement
that is, with an agreement that would give the Republic of Ireland
little or no consultative role in Northern Ireland,

whereas the

SDLP wanted to negotiate an agreement that would "transcend in
importance any agreement ever made",

that is,

an agreement that

would give them at least, if not more than, what they had already
secured in the Anglo-Irish Agreement. Hence the impasse, not simply
a failure of the minds to meet.
PARTY POSITIONS
When

the

talks

were

suspended

irreconciliable dichotomies on

in

1992,

because

almost every question -

of

the

easily

evinced from the preceding outlines of how parties were thinkiing
at the time -

the following appeared to be the positions of

the

constitutional political parties regarding party talks.
The Alliance Party:

In the view of the Alliance Party,

public view of the Social Democratic and Labour Party
that they want power sharing.

(SDLP)

the
is

But now the SDLP do not see power
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sharing along the lines of the 1973/74 Sunningdale model as being
acceptable.

The SDLP is taking a more extreme position than it did

20 years ago.

The SDLP is doing exactly what Unionists did for a

generation: they are driving the opposition into a corner.

When

Unionists went to Dublin they found none of the generosity they had
been led to expect.
The Democratic Unionist Party (DUP):

In the view of the DUP,

the SDLP brought to the table a set of proposals which were so
outrageous that their own friends (among them The Irish Times) were
surprised and puzzled.
opening gambit.

Everyone thought the proposals were an

But it became clear the SDLP was not prepared to

negotiate these proposals.
on all sides.

On one occasion concessions were made

An agreement was

reached on the form an internal

government should take.But one day later, the SDLP reneged on the
agreement.

Their proposals on the final day of talks were in the

same shape and form as they were on the first day of talks.
Dublin made a number of comments before the talks process
indicating that Unionists would be surprised at the generosity of
Dublin, but Dublin was implacable on the question of Articles 2 and
3.

They were on the table, but only to be debated.

There seemed

to be no willingness to reform the constitution and it was quite
clear that there was no business that could be done with them.
The Ulster Unionist Party (UUP):

Unionists took Hume at his

word; they "took the bull by the horns" and went to Dublin.

The

visit to Dublin became an exercise in semantics.

Dublin literally

got

a

stuck on whether

there

could or would be

Articles 2 and 3, if certain things happened.
the better part of two days.

referendum on

This issue occupied

The paper that the UUP put forward on

North-South relations was one people thought was a good,
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fair,

and

generous paper,

and a good basis on which to have an agreement.

But it was not even considered by the Irish'side or the
The Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP):

SDLP.~·

The SDLP had

strong reservations about the government of Northern Ireland being
controlled by an Assembly.

The likelihood would be that it would

behave the way local councils behave,

in fact,

that the Assembly

would turn out to be a larger version of the Belfast City Council,
that what you were against would matter,
That it would be a disaster.

not what you were for.

Hence the SDLP proposals for a type

of administration modeled partly on the European model and partly
on the American model.
DEMOGRAPHY AND SEGREGATION
In divided

societies,

social

and pol i tical

change

do

not

adhere to the narrow contours of parochial party politics.

The

interstices of social and cultural variables have a more lasting
impact on political developments than the day-to-day megaphonediplomacy that passes for political dialogue.
Foremost among these factors is demography. Three aspects are
most important in the demographic changes taking place in Northern
Ireland:

(1) the rate of growth of the respective populations;

(2)

the spatial distribution of the populations; and (3) the increasing
segregation taking place across Northern Ireland,
Belfast and Derry.
communities:

especially in

Add to this the widening gulf between the two

increasingly, they live apart.

About one-half of the province's 1.5 million residents live in
areas more

than

90 percent

Protestant or

95 percent Catholic.

Overall, the 1991 census shows that the Catholic population came to
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41.4 percent and is most probably rising,

while the Protestant

population is at 54.1 percent and most likely falling.

"What is

all the more disconcerting," Mark Brennock writes in The Irish

Times, "is the relative speed of the changes.
Catholics stood at 34.7 percent.

Twenty years ago

This population has increased by

seven percent in the last two decades."
Moreover,

recent

studies

point

to

a

higher

Protestants than Catholics leaving Northern Ireland.

number

of

Almost forty

percent of Northern Ireland university students go to colleges in
Britain. More than two-thirds of them are Protestants.

At present

more than half the students at Queen's University are Cathobics.
This

is

However,

probably

due

to

the

level

of

Protestant

emigration.

it is also due to the offspring of the previous high

Catholic birth rates reaching the age at which they can attend
college.

The school population in Belfast is now believed to have

an equal balance between Catholics and Protestants.
Bann,

Catholics have a majori ty of up

to

three

West of the

to one

in the

schools.
The political effects of the change can be seen most starkly
in the North's 26 local
majorities in 1971;

government areas.

Seven had Catholic

11 had Catholic majorities in 1991,

with a

further two having a Catholic proportion of over forty percent and
rising.

Most dramatically, the Catholic proportion of the Belfast

population has risen from 31.2 percent in 1971 to 42.5 percent in
1991.

What all this underscores is that in the context of Northern

Ireland, the concepts of majority and minority are irrelevant.
The religious divide is also striking in geographical terms.
58

to require new political arrangements in the short run to alleviate
it,

whereas the possible level of alienation in the Protestant

communi ty was thought to be containable in the long run.

This

latter assumption has proved to be dangerously misleading.
Unfortunately,

even

though

the

new poli tical

arrangements

successfully addressed some Catholic concerns and support for Sinn
Fein diminished somewhat, or at least levelled off,

this did not

led to a stable political environment conducive to some hardheaded
peace-bargaining or political

stabili ty or

a

alienation between Catholics and Protestants.

reduced

level

of

Reforms attributed

to the Agreement by the SDLP may have weaned Nationalist votes away
from Sinn Fein,

but this had not resulted in a decrease

activities of the IRA.

i~

the

There is no necessary relationship between

the capacity or will of the IRA to commit acts of violence and the
level

of political support for Sinn Fein,

a

fact

the

IRA made

abundantly clear over the last several years when it has carried
out some of its more wanton acts of violence.
On the contrary, the IRA was able to step up its campaign of
violence; in each year since the Agreement went into effect,

the

level of IRA violence has exceeded its pre-Agreement levels.

The

average number of killings per year since 1985 has exceeded 1985
levels.

Until the IRA's announcement of a ceasefire in September

1994, it was able to strike randomly, ruthlessly, and with little
regard

for

life.

Each new killing of a member of the Ulster

Defense Regiment (UDR) , an army regiment recruited only in Northern
Ireland, it is almost exclusively Protestant and is now part of the
Royal Irish Regiment (RIC), or the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) ,
the Northern Ireland Police,

also predominantly Protestant,

has

only strengthened the conviction of Protestants, who already see
themselves as the victims of a calculatedly cold-blooded campaign
of genocide or what they now refer to as ethnic cleansing conducted
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the one hand, there is the carrot:

The more willing Unionists are

to share power with Nationalists,
Conference,

the smaller the

role of the

and hence the smaller the role of the South in the

affairs of the North.

And on the other hand, there is the stick:

The longer Unionists refuse to share power,

the larger and more

long-lasting the role of the South in the affairs of the North.
In

this

sense,

the Agreement

was

designed

to

undermine

Unionist intransigence.
In Northern Ireland, Nationalists overwhelmingly supported the
Agreement

and Unionists

overwhelmingly rej ected

it.

With

the

passage of time, however, Nationalist support has eroded since, the
Agreement has made little difference in the day-to-day lives of
Catholics and has failed to deliver on some of the more conspicuous
promises of reform, especially in the area of the administration of
justice, that were made at the time of its signing
opposition has remained firm.

One poll,

after

Stalker/Sampson

the

imbroglio

over

the

taken in 1988 shortly

rejection of the appeal of the Birmingham Six,
sixteen percent

of

Catholics

believed

while Unionist

that

report

and

the

found that only

the

Agreement

had

benefited the minority community, while an overwhelming eighty-one
percent of Catholic respondents could find no benefit to their
community from it.

Protestants, of course, found even less in the

Agreement with which they could identify:

Eighty-five percent of

Protestant respondents believed that Protestants had not benefited
from the Agreement and only a minuscule four percent could point to
some benefit to their community.
Nevertheless, despite opinion polls, SDLP leaders insist that
the Agreement has had a more subtle psychological impact in the
Catholic community:

that the feeling of isolation from the rest of

the country has decreased;

that the impact of the Agreement has
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Almost every local authority west of the river Bann has a Catholic
majori ty,

Currently three

as has that area taken as a whole.

counties; Derry, Fermanagh, and Tyrone, have Catholic majorities,
so that there are in fact two minorities in Northern Ireland, one
east of the Bann and one west of the Bann.

Moreover,

since 1978

the number of Catholics born each year has exceeded the number of
Protestants

while

seven

out

of

10

deaths

are

of

Protestants,

suggesting a younger growing Catholic population and an older, more
slowly growing Protestant population.
Twenty years ago,

the Protestant population of the Shankill

was 76,000; today it is 27,000.
Belfast

has

fallen

from

The Protestant population of North

150,000

in

1982

to

67,000

today.

Protestants see themselves as being in retreat; Catholics as being
on the ascendent.
In the last twenty years, of the 566 district council wards,
the number of predominantly Catholic wards has increased from 43 to
120; areas almost exclusively Protestant has risen from 56 to 115.
The so-called Peace Wall that cuts through Belfast slicing streets
into Catholic and Protestant ghettos is living testimony to the
depth of the divisions and the manner in which people deal with it.
Thus, even if the level of violence has fallen over the last
14 years, the level of polarization and segregation, amounting in
many

cases

to

de

facto

apartheid,

has

not

been

conducive

to

developing a climate that will bring to fruition the seeds of trust
and tolerance,

and the mutual understanding that are constantly

emphasized as being the necessary underpinnings of a settlement.
Government housing policy,

is for all practical purposes,
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one of

segregation,
But

that

motivated,

should

segregation:

not

in part,
obscure

by considerations of security.
the

more

most housing segregation

fundamental

cause

of

is voluntarily chosen by

members of both communities as a matter of preference and is not
government imposed.

One, result is that as the level of contact

between Catholic and Protestant has fallen over the last 25 years,
ignorance, suspicion, and distrust - the bases of prejudice - have
risen.
As a result of the geographical dispersion of the population,
politicians will have to take into account the anatomy of Northern
Ireland before developing political structures for the whole unit;
in a restructured Northern Ireland special arrangements will have
to be made,

particularly for policing,

on the west side of the

Bann.
"Nationalists are winning",
Protestant

working

classes,

that

that,

is
and

the perception of the
the

belief

that

if

nationalists hold to their demands and refuse compromise, they
will eventually prevail when Britain finds a way out of Ireland and
abandons Northern Protestants to their own devices.

These themes

recur frequently in Belfast where there is a marked difference
between the attitudes in both working class communi ties on the
Falls, the Shankill, and North Belfast.

On the Catholic side there

is a marked preoccupation with the behavior of the security forces,
the constant harassment of young people,

the

intimidation,

the

unacceptability of the RUC, the maladministration of justice, the
marginalization

of

their

political

representatives,

and

unemployment and deprivation.
But while unemployment and deprivation are also one among many
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concerns

in

Protestant

working

class

areas,

Protestants

are

obsessed with a deeply-felt sense that they are losing, even though
they often find it difficult to articulate exactly what it is they
are losing.

They believe that they are somehow being pushed out,

that the concerns of the Protestant working class are ignored, that
the Protestant working class is being mistreated,

that they are

being made the scapegoat for the actions of the Protestant ruling
classes in the past.
Add

to

community

the

brew

leadership,

Protestant
that

perceptions

Catholics

are

that

better

they

at

lack

community

development, more skilled at raising funding and getting publicity,
and the disquiet in Protestant working class areas,

the sense of

being the deprived majority, has disturbing overt ones overt that
spillover into violence.
demand,

"An eye for an eye" is increasingly the

even though it leaves everybody blind.

Protestants feel

they have been giving everything for the last twenty-five years;
Catholics feel
recognition

they have not caught up.

among

Protestants

that

There is scarcely any

Catholics

against and have some catching up to do.

are

discriminated

Protestants in working

class areas do not accept the claim that Catholics are still more
than

twice

as

likely

to

be

unemployed

and

they

see

the

Fair

Employment Commission (FEC) as a way of "doing Protestants down."
Central

to

the

sense

of

anger

in Belfast

is

the

feeling

working class Protestants have of being squeezed out and their
equation of this sense of being pushed out with the belief that
Catholics are winning, and that loss of territory is evidence of an
advancing Catholic community,

that their current experiences in

Northern Ireland are a precursor of what fate awaits them in some
61

future all-Ireland state.
LOYALIST VIOLENCE

This

is

paramilitary

the

context

violence

that

in

which

began

in

the
1992

understood. The new policy: literally,

upsurge
and

in

1993

Loyalist
must

be

"an eye for an eye" - for

every murdered Protestant (i.e. member of the security forces), a
dead Catholic.

For the first time, greater numbers of people - all

of them Catholic- were being killed by the UVF and UFF than the
number of security personnel, civilians and loyalists being killed
by the IRA. The fact that these killings were for the most part
random killings added a more frightening dimension to the conflict;
proof, as if proof was needed,

that in situations of conflict, a

political vacuum will create the violence needed to fill it.
There are, in fact, two wars:

the class war reflected in the

data for fatalities for North and West Belfast especially, and the
Border

war,

conducted

in

nationalist/Unionist lines.

rural

areas

along

more

traditional

Over forty percent of all deaths have

occurred in West Belfast or North Belfast.

Areas of greatest

deprivation are also the areas of greatest violence.

Forty-five

percent of Northern Ireland's unemployment and 65 percent of the
violence are in these areas.
one and a horizontal one.
and Protestants,

There are two divisions, a vertical
The vertical one is between Catholics

the horizontal one between haves and have-nots.

In Northern Ireland, it's when the two intersect that the conflict
has been the worst.
Between 1969 and 1989 Loyalist paramilitary organizations
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were responsible for
total.
flows

691 deaths,

or twenty-five percent of the

Usually Loyalist violence has come in cycles and ebbs and
with

variations

in

political

patterns of tit-for-tat killings.

circumstance,

in

recurring

In 1991, Loyalist paramilitary

organizations were responsible for 42 dead, or nearly 45 per cent
of fatalities;

in 1992 for 35 dead,

also nearly 45 per cent of

fatalities; in 1993 for 49 dead, or 58 per cent of fatalities; and
in 1994, before the declaration of cease fires,
per cent of fatalities.

for 35 dead or 60

These totals are greater than for killings

by republican paramilitary organizations during the same periods.

What made this cycle of violence more ominous was the manner
in which it differed from the violence of the 1970s.
ruthless,

more sophisticated,

penetration.

more efficient,

It was more

and less open to

It was also generationally different. Members of the

UDA or UVF in the 1970s were there to protect the status quo; in
many ways they were convinced that they had the implicit support of
the unionist parties,

and were,

in some instances,

their armed

surrogates.
Members were part of the "old Northern Ireland," grew up under
successive unionist regimes, believed that Northern Ireland was a
Protestant state for a Protestant people, and even if they did not
share

in

belonged

Protestant
to

position.

the

privilege

superior

and

group

wanted

they
to

believed
preserve

they
their

The Protestant working classes were marginally better

than their Catholic counterparts,
"belonged"

and

power,

to

the

if only in the sense that they

ruling sectarian communi ty.

Even

for

those

Protestants who were close to the bottom of the economic heap, it
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was comforting to know that Catholics as a class were worse off.
It fed the myth of superiority, ascension, exclusivity.
All that has changed.
Ireland

has

been

under

It is often forgotten that Northern

Direct

Rule

for

22

years,

for

one-third of the life of the Northern Ireland state.
loyalist paramilitaries are different.
conflict erupted in 1969

almost

Today's

Many were born after the

or the imposition of Direct Rule in 1972.

They have no reference point for Protestant privilege and power,
never knew Stormont rule.

Given the increasing alienation that has

taken hold in Protestant working-class areas, they see themselves
as constantly losing,

see nationalists as winning, and see their

relative position continuing to decline.
And they saw more: that violence pays; the IRA, in their eyes,
has

squeezed

concession

after

government; that in the end,
bite of the bullet.
The
response

it,

from

the

British

the only thing that counted was the

And they had their role model: the IRA.

escalating
to

concession

rise

and

the

in

Loyalist

violence

seeming paralysis

and

among

the

the

IRA's

Northern

Ireland political parties in the face of a worsening situation
finally

persuaded

both

governments,

especially

the

British

government, as the sovereign power, to take action.
If

one

series

of

events

galvanizing them into action,
descended upon Belfast in
October 23,

the

can be

pinpointed as

it was,

perhaps,

last

pivotal

in

the carnage that

week of October 1993.

On

an IRA bomb exploded in a crowded food store on the

Shankill Road, killing nine Protestants, one Catholic, and injuring
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seriously fifty others. The Protestant paramilitaries promised to
exact a "terrible revenge."
They did,

killing within days an equal number of Catholics.

In the wake of these killings, the two governments held a series of
meetings leading to a Joint Declaration by Irish Prime Minister
Albert Reynolds and British Prime Minister John Major.

THE JOINT DECLARATION

The Declaration on the 15 December, 1993 once again set odown
the conditions that Sinn Fein and the IRA would have to meet in
order to become part of the ephemeral

"peace process." Of foremost

importance was the stipulation that there had to be a permanent end
to the use of, or support for, paramilitary violence.
For its part, the Irish government acknowledged that it would
be "wrong to impose a united Ireland in the absence of the freely
given consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland."
And for its part, the British government reiterated that it had "no
selfish, strategic or economic interest" in Northern Ireland.
But

the

Declaration

also

contained

ambiguous,

and

even

seemingly contradictory references regarding the crucial question
of consent. "It is for the people of Ireland alone, by agreement
between the two parts respectively," it said, "to exercise their
right to self-determination on the basis of consent,
concurrently

given,

North

and

South,

Ireland, if that is their wish."
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to

bring

about

freely and
a

uni ted

The decision by the IRA to announce a ceasefire was not one
that was the product of an enthusiastic turnabout or a new-found
commitment to non-violence, but one hammered out in the trenches of
hardball political strategising,

one agonizingly reached by old

comrades imprisoned by unbreachable bonds, haunted by the memories
of what had happened when the IRA leadership had agreed to a cease
fire in 1975, a ceasefire that had all but destroyed the movement.
The fact that those who most passionately argued for a ceasefire in
1993/' 94

were among those who had most vociferously opposed a

ceasefire in 1975, and ,indeed, had ousted the previous leadership
because of its ineptitude in managing that cease fire, added to the
irony of their deliberations.
DEVELOPMENTS FOLLOWING THE CEASE FIRES

Meanwhile,

the British and Irish governments developed a

Joint

Framework Document, made public on February 22, 1995, that will be
used as the basis for future negotiations.

The framework document

reinforces the Joint Declaration reiterating once again that no
change in the constitutional status will take place without the
consent of the people of Northern Ireland.
However,
between

there
the

two

were

also

many dissimilarities

governments

regarding

how

and

differences

negotiations

should

proceed and what criteria should be met before negotiations could
begin.

The

fundamental

points

of

contention

between

the

two

governments remain, as ever, the South's constitutional claims to
sovereignty over the North,

and the future form the North/South

relationship would take.
Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution claim that the entire
"national territory" of Ireland falls under the jurisdiction of the
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In many quarters,

the Joint Declaration was seen as little

more than an awkward reworking of the AlA, especially of Article 1
regarding the constitutional status of Northern Ireland.

(" .. . its

essential balance," said Sir David Goodall, one of the architects
of the AlA,

"is no different from that struck in Article 1 of the

Anglo-Irish Agreement ... ")
Nevertheless,

the

Declaration

was

well

received,

perhaps

because it committed British Prime Minister John Major to putting
Northern Ireland on the British political agenda.

CEASE FIRES

Military stalemate, the long hard drain on republican families,
especially the families of prisoners,

hints by the British that

they would be prepared to consider new initiatives, the absence of
any sense of progress on the political front,

the levelling-off of

Sinn Fein's capacity to make an electoral breakthrough; indeed, the
more likely reality of an impending electoral eclipse, the fruits
of the dialogue the SDLP, under John Hume's direction,

initiated

with Sinn Fein in the late 1980s, the talks that continued between
Hume and Adams after the official termination of talks between the
two parties in 1990?, the dialogue within the republican movement
and

between

Laughlin

and

republican
the

IRA's

leaders
Army

like

Adams,

Council,

the

McGuinness

and Mc

consultations

with

prisoners that Sinn Fein and the IRA should begin to explore new
paradigms culminated in a decision by the Army Council to give the
politics of a cease fire a chance, but with the clear understanding
that the advocates of a cease fire would have to prove the efficacy
of their strategy - a cease fire,
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yes; but a conditional one.

Irish state.

This, of course, is in contradiction to the concept

of

consent,

majority

which

successive

subscribed to for two decades.

Irish

governments

have

It was the view of the British

government that the framework document could not be completed until
these differences were resolved.
The second point of difference between the two governments is the
form and extent of the North/South relationship.

The Irish Prime

Minister Albert Reynolds proposed that a series of

North/South

institutions

to

with

executive

powers

be

established

promote

economic development and cooperation between both parts of Ireland.
Most Northern Ireland Protestants would be extremely wary of such
institutional

structures,

almost

certainly

to

the

point

of

rejection, assuming that they were one more step in the direction
of an all-Ireland state.
Prime Ministers Major and Reynolds met at Chequers on October 24,
1994 to discuss the drafting of the framework document.

At the

time, their meeting was not thought to have yielded much agreement
or understanding.
for

further

However, on November 4, Reynolds cleared the way

action

by

explicitly

stating

that

the

Irish

Constitution would be changed to "make it clear in constitutional
terms for the first time that the Irish people say in unequivocal
terms that there will be no change in the constitutional position
of Northern Ireland without the consent of the majority."

(NY

Times, November 4, 1994).
An earlier move by John Major also facilitated talks between the
two

governments.

On

October

22,

1994,

he

announced

that

his

government would accept the "working assumption" that the IRA cease
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fire was intended to be permanent and that representatives of the
government would likely meet with Sinn Fein before Christmas.
In addition he announced that cross-border roads would be reopened
in phases;

that the exclusion orders forbidding Gerry Adams and

Martin

Guinness

Mc

from

entering

mainland

Britain

had

been

rescinded; and that the British government would publish a series
of its own proposals for peace in Northern Ireland along with the
framework document (Irish Times, October 23) .

Acceptance of the "working assumption," was key to the continuation
of the negotiating process. Until mid-October, Major's government
had insisted that Sinn Fein publicly announce its intentions for a
permanent cease fire.

Other items in Major's statement were also

intended to

nationalists,

"appease"

many of whom were accusing

Major of taking a "Unionist" position and intentionally delaying
the negotiating process.
In the South, a Forum for Peace and Reconciliation was established
by Reynolds.

The terms of reference for the Forum stated that it

had been established "to consult on and examine ways

in which

lasting peace, stability and reconciliation [could] be established
by agreement among the people of Ireland, on the steps required to
remove barriers of distrust, and on the basis of promoting respect
for

the

equal

identities."

rights

and

validity

of

both

traditions

and

(Irish Times, October 1994)

On October 29,

the first session of the forum was held in Dublin

Castle. Although the unionists parties were invited to attend,
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they

declined to do so. Representation in the forum was decided by past
electoral performance. The 38 forum seats were held by Fianna Fail
(9), Fine Gael (6), the Labour Party (5), the Progressive Democrats

(2),

the

Democratic

Left

(1),

the

Green

Party

(1)

from

the

Republic; and, the SDLP (5), the Alliance Party (3) and Sinn Fein
(3) from Northern Ireland. The remaining seat was held by the late
Gordon Wilson from Northern Ireland.
Following the first meeting of the forum,

it was announced that

subsequent meetings would be devoted to issues such as: security
matters and policing; economic development; constitutional issues
and

political

structures;

wi thin Northern

Ireland;

North/South
fundamental

cooperation;
rights

and

cooperation

freedoms;

and,

obstacles to building trust.
The Irish government seemed to envisage the forum as a means of
establishing the North/South executive institutions Reynolds had
proposed earlier in the Autumn.
issues

such

as:

internal

These institutions would address

investment

in

Ireland;

tourism;

agriculture and fishing; the environment; and energy and commerce.
Both

Reynolds

nationalists

and

were

Spring
to

made

accept

the

it

abundantly

concept

of

that

clear

consent,

then

if
the

unionists would have to support strong North/South links.
The unionist reaction to the forum was not unexpected. A letter
signed by local representatives of the DUP,
chairperson,
alleged

that

Judge Catherine McGuinness,
the

forum

was

based

on

given to the forum's

at the opening session,
an

"illegal

claim"

to

jurisdiction over Northern Ireland and that it was an "autonomous
pan-nationalist front."

(Irish Times 10/29).
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The Ulster Unionist

Party (UUP) did not openly denounce the forum,

but it refused to

participate.
Divisions within the Unionist camp emerged as the peace process
continued.

This

is

reflected particularly

in

the

differences

between the two main unionist parties, and also between the DUP and
the Progressive Unionist Party

(PUP)

and the Ulster Democratic

Party (UDP). The PUP and UDP represent the loyalist paramilitary
groups.
The DUP rejected the forum

out- of- hand. In an article published

in the Irish Times Deputy Leader Peter Robinson said that the DUP
believed that the IRA cease fire would continue only as long as the
IRA could wring concessions out of the unionists.
DUP to enter the negotiating process,

In order for the

the two governments would

have to give a pledge that a referendum

be conducted before any

negotiations regarding the status of Northern Ireland could begin.

While the UUP is more centrist, it, too, has stood firm on a number
of issues, insisting on changes in the Republic's constitution to
give expression to its position on consent.
Most important,

however,

parties

question of

on

the

was the unequivocal insistence by both
the

decommissioning

of

arms.

They

demanded that the IRA hand over its caches of weapons, before they
would begin to entertain the idea of all-party negotiations.
In addition to differences between the DUP and UUP, there are also
differences

between

the

mainstream
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unionist

parties

and

their

counterparts

to

the

right.

The

PUP

and UDP moved

quickly to

support the peace process by claiming credit for bringing about the
loyalist cease

fire.

This action

irked the mainstream unionist

parties, especially the DUP, since it indicated that the far-right
wing of the unionist community was satisfied that the Union was
under no threat and was comfortable with the British government's
assurances on the question of consent. Moreover, both the PUP and
the UDP publicly stated their desire to meet with Sinn Fein as soon
as

Gerry Adams

began

talks

with

the

Bri tish

government.

The

actions of the PUP and UDP were seen by some as embarrassing to the
UUP and DUP, by making them appear to be slow-moving and reluctant
to advance the process.
The DUP immediately issued a statement rejecting the paramilitaries
, positions and spelling out a number of conditions that would have
to be met before they would engage in talks,

including assurances

by the British and Irish governments that a referendum would be
held before any negotiations began and that its results would have
to be declared binding and permanent.
that the IRA's announcement of a

What happened, in effect, is

cease fire caught the mainstream

unionist parties off-guard, a political vacuum opened, and the farright moved quickly to fill it.
In early November, Reynolds announced a series of legal changes in
the Republic,

including lifting the state of emergency that had

prevailed in the South since 1939,

plans to release a number of

Northern Ireland prisoners held in the Republic, and the passage of
legislation to allow the for the repatriation of Irish prisoners
from British jails.
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In late November/December 1994, a series of political upheavals in
the Republic threatened to slow, if not derail,

the peace process.

First, Reynolds was forced to resign as Prime Minister, when the
Labour party,

Fianna Fail's partner in coali tion,

wi thdrew its

support. The Labour Party's action came after it learned that the
Attorney General's office waited for seven months before acting on
an extradition warrant for a priest accused of molesting a boy in
Northern Ireland. Moreover, Reynolds, despite his knowledge of the
affair proceeded to appoint the Attorney General, Harry Whelehan,
to the position of president of the High Court.
Bertie Ahern, the acting Minister of Finance, was elected leader of
Fianna Fail and entered into negotiations with Labour to form a new
government. But a series of disclosures in the Irish Times strongly
suggested that several Fianna Fail ministers may have had knowledge
of the Whelehan case which had been withheld from the Dail. Labour
promptly broke off its negotiations with Fianna Fail.
After much brokering,

a

new government

composed of

Fine Gael,

Labour, and the Democratic Left, the so-called "Rainbow Coalition,"
headed by John Bruton,

leader of Fine Gael.

Dick Sring retained

his positions as Tanaiste and Minister of Foreign Affairs. Bruton,
who is well-known for his moderate positions on Northern Ireland,
especially in regard to Articles 2 and 3, met almost immediately
after being elected Prime Minister wi th Gerry Adams

to dispel

doubts as to the authenticity of his nationalist credentials.

DECOMMISSIONING
Moreover,

there

is

an

element
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of

the

incredulous

to

the

British

government's

guarantee

of

a

place

in

any

multi-party

negotiating forum to Sinn Fein, if only the IRA decommissions its
arms.

The DUP,

for example,

have made it clear that it has no

intention of joining Sinn Fein in any multi-lateral negotiating
process

at

the

moment

decommissioning of

arms,

(June1996) ,
and

the

decommissioning

Bri tish

position to impose its will in the matter.

government

or

is

no

in

no

Of course the British

can negotiate to their hearts content with Nationalists of every
hue, but in the absence of across-the-board Unionist participation,
the whole process would have an air of Alice-in-Wonderland.
The British Government made the decommissioning of arrp.s a
stumbling block to progress. Ultimately, it is up to the government
to undo the problem.

In South Africa,

when the National Party

government tried to make the decommissioning of arms a precondition
for

African

National

negotiations,

Congress

(ANC)

participation

in

formal

the two sides got together and worked the problem

out. The deliberations of their joint decommissioning committee did
not, however, get in the way of substantive political negotiations.
The rest, as they say, is history.
The fact is that the decommissioning of arms in a situation of
conflict is a byproduct of negotiations rather than a precondition
for negotiations; it is an outcome rather than an enabler of the
process;
rather

it is a consequence of establishing a climate of trust
than

evolution

of

a

precursor
an

for

agreed-upon

trust;

it

political

is

contingent

framework

on

rather

the
than

something that emerges out of a political vacuum.
In Northern Ireland the results of the political impasse on
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the question of decommissioning began to unravel what had always
been a tenuous peace-process. During the summer and fall of 1995,
there was a steady drift into confrontations between Protestants
and Catholics,
towards

increasingly ugly,

violence,

increasingly

increasingly inching their way
reminiscent

of

the

sectarian

confrontations of the late 1960s that were a prelude to the wider
conflict.
Fifteen months
had

little

to

after the IRA declared a cease fire, Sinn Fein

show

in

terms

of

pol i tical

gains ,

giving

more

credence in the movement to the arguments of the hard men, who had
been only reluctantly persuaded to the merits of a cease fire,

that

the only thing on the British agenda is to smash the IRA.
The IRA has faced this kind of predicament before when the
contradictions

of

deeply-held

posi tions

led

to

splits

in

the

movement between those who believe that the way forward is to join
the

constitutional

process,

despi te

its

deficiencies

and

disappointments, and those who believe that physical force is the
only kind of diplomacy the British understand.

Until late 1995,

the former were having their way, but the latter were waiting in
the wings.
More ominously, talks between the British government and Sinn
Fein had,

for all intents and purposes,

broken down,

while the

Irish government and the SDLP had not been able to find a formula
for decommissioning, whether it involved an international mediation
body or some other "neutral"

institution,

British government and Sinn Fein.
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that would satisfy the

Still more unsettling was Sinn Fein's failure in February 1996
to sign the final report of the Forum on Peace and Reconciliation,
because

of

its

unwillingness

to

endorse

the

commission's

recommendations in regard to the question of consent.

The question of consent remains the bogeyman,

exposing the

essence of the irreconciliable elements of the conflict. No matter
what language is used to obfuscate the issue,
conflict

remain

unconvinced

of

the

good

the parties to the

intentions

of

their

protagionists.
A ROLE FOR THE UNITED STATES?

In January 1994,

President Clinton,

despi te the vociferous

protestations of the British government approved a visa for Gerry
Adams to enter the United States.
1994,

Almost a year later, in December

in response to enormous and sustained pressure from Irish

nationalist organizations,

he appointed Senator George Mitchell,

former President of the United States Senate as his Special Adviser
on Northern Ireland. On March 16, 1995, he received Gerry Adams in
the White House; in May 1995, he hosted a White House Conference on
Trade and Investment in Northern Ireland, and in November 1995, he
became the first US President to visit Northern Ireland, where he
was received with exceptional warmth in both communities.
If

the

United

States

is

to

play

a

constructive

role

in

promoting the peace-process in Northern Ireland, it must be seen to
be unerringly even-handed, by both communities in Northern Ireland.
Otherwise the US,

too,

will,

unwittingly and despite the best of
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intentions,

get

sucked

into

the

treacherous

swamps

of

the

province's tribal politics, perceived by Protestants as being one
more ally of Catholic interests.
While

the

"honest broker,"

British

government

likes

to

see

itself

as

the

in the peace process, and prides itself as having

equal regard for the interests of both communities, it is a role it
cannot play, despite its numerous and often plaintive protestations
to the contrary, since it,

too,

is seen by both the Catholic and

Protestant communities as being part of the problem.
It is in this regard that the United States can carve a n>iche
for itself, but only if it understands the rules of the game and
has a clear understanding of what negotiations might lead to, and
what they cannot lead to.

WHAT IS THE PEACE PROCESS?
The peace-process is not about Irish unification.

Indeed, the

question of Irish unification will not be on the negotiating
agenda, not because Unionists are setting pre-conditions for
negotiations, but because the question doesn't fall within the
parameters of the multi-party talks that were scheduled to begin
on June 10, 1996.
Both the Irish and British governments have irrevocably committed
themselves to one principle:

that the unity of Ireland can only

come about when a majority of the people of Northern Ireland give
their consent in a free and fair referendum to such a change in
their political status. This principle is embodied in the Anglo77

,·
Irish Agreement (1985), which was lodged with the United Nations
and is internationally binding; again in the Downing Street
Declaration (1993), and the subsequent Framework Document (1994)
in which the two governments set out their suggestions as to the
way forward.

In addition, the Social Democratic and Labour Party

(SDLP), which speaks for at least two-thirds of the Catholics of
Northern Ireland are equally committed to the principle of
freely-given consent. There is unanimity of agreement that
consent for a united Ireland does not exist at present nor for
the foreseeable future.
Unionists have a right, therefore, to demand an

unequivoc~

declaration from Sinn Fein, the political wing of the IRA,

that

it fully subscribes to this over-riding principle, which provides
the context in which future talks will take place. If Sinn Fein
refuses to give such an undertaking, then Unionists have a right
to boycott multi-lateral talks, since their participation under
these circumstances would suggest that they had somehow
acquiesced on the principle of consent.
This declaration from Sinn Fein on the primacy of consent within
Northern Ireland as a precondition for the unification of Ireland
is far more important than the interminable arguments over the
decommissioning of arms by the IRA.

If the Unionists and the

British government are serious about finding a way to handle the
decommissioning of arms, they have only to look at the way in
which the question has been handled in other conflict-areas of
the world. The key word is compromise -- a concept Unionists
still have problems understanding, but in the absence of which,
there can be no progress.
78

Given the iron-clad guarantee the Unionists have with regard to
their constitutional position, the fact that the IRA cease fire
has held and that Sinn Fein has entered the arena of
constitutional politics, the UUP, in particular, must ultimately
convince its constituency that it has to start making the
compromises that will secure the peace.
THE MITCHELL COMMISSION

When the IRA declared a cease fire,

it seemed that the last

hurdle to peace talks involving all the parties to the conflict in
Northern Ireland had been successfully overcome and that peace
talks would finally get under way.
But like most things involving Northern Ireland, matters were
not

quite

that

simple,

and

the

process

slid

ineluctably

into

stalemate over the question of the decommissioning of arms.
On November 28, 1995, days before President Clinton's visit to
Northern Ireland, the Irish and British governments established an
International Body,

chaired by

George Mitchell,

the president's

special envoy to Northern Ireland.
The commission was charged with the task of coming up with a
set

of

recommendations

that

would

break

the

impasse

on

decommissioning and open the way for multi-party talks to proceed.
The

commission

issued its

report

on January

24,

1996.

It

called on all parties to commit themselves to six principles which,
the commission felt,

would,

if adhered to,
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lead to an honorable

peace.
These principles called for a commi tment on all

sides to:

democratic and exclusively peaceful means of resolving political
issues; the total disarmament of all paramilitary organizations;
the renunciation of the use of force to influence the outcome of
negotiations; reliance only on peaceful means in trying to alter
any aspect of an outcome with which they might disagree; and an end
to "punishment" beatings.
On the questioning of decommissioning,
the

irreconcilable di fferences

the commission noted

among the parties

involved,

and

suggested a compromise: that decommissioning take place in tandem
with talks.
In response,

British Prime Minister John Major said in the

House of Commons that in the absence of some decommissioning of
arms by the IRA prior to multi-party negotiations, he would call
for some form of an elected assembly in Northern Ireland which
would be used to work out the modalities of negotiation.

All

parties, including Sinn Fein, would be entitled to participate in
this assembly, according to their electoral mandates.

Mr. Major's

proposal was backed by Tony Blair, leader of the opposition Labour
party

and by Paddy Ashdown, leader of the Liberal Democrats - both

parties endorse the idea of an united Ireland.
On

the

Nationalist

side

all

hell

broke

loose.

Major

was

accused of everything from deceiving the Irish government, which
Major had failed to consul t

before he had gone public,

protocols of the Anglo-Irish Agreement called for;
80

as

the

of cynically

aligning himself to the Ulster Unionists, who had put forward the
idea of an election in the first place,

in order to bolster his

wafer thin majority in parliament; to endorsing a return to oldtime "stormont Rule" under which the Unionist majority had ruled
(misruled)

Northern

Nationalist

Ireland

aspirations

and

for

fifty

siding

wi th

years;
the

to

betraying

proponents

of

an

internal solution; and even of trying to destroy the fragile peace
process to secure his own grip on power.
There was no way,

the Nationalist parties ( John Hurne's SDLP

and Gerry Adams' Sinn Fein) furned that they would ever agree to an
election.

It was not, they were quick to point out, included among

the recommendations of the Mitchell commission

(even though the

commission endorsed the idea, that "if it were broadly acceptable,
with an appropriate mandate and within the three-strand structure,
an

elective

process

could

contribute

to

the

building

of

confidence") .
And so things rested.

The British maintained

that in the

absence of some decommissioning before talks, the Unionists would
not participate, making talks meaningless.
they argued,

Hence,

the only way,

to get all the parties around the same table was to

hold elections that would give a democratic mandate to all sides to
participate in the resulting forum.
Nationalists saw things in a starkly different light: in their
view, the British, as always, were allowing Unionists to exercise
a veto over the process.
Even staunch Major supporters acknowledge that he mishandled
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his response to the Mitchell report,
accusations
Nationalists,

that

were

leveled

at

leaving himself open to the
him,

providing

grounds

for

to believe that the Bri tish were up to their old

tricks, past masters, as they were perceived to be, of the art of
speaking out of both sides of their mouths and acting only on what
appeared to be most expedient to their own narrow interests.
Once

again,

the

British

failed

to

recognize

the

special

sensitivities they must exercise in relation to Irish matters; once
again they showed that they still had failed to learn the lessons
of the historical past, even the recent past, and their failure to
learn was seen in nationalist circles as a measure of their hubris;
it became part of the inventory of grievance.
The Mitchell commission, however,

was careful not to append

the words "we recommend" to its proposals on decommissioning.
language is studiously neutral,
parties

should

consider

an

the language of suggestion

approach ... that

compromise"), not the language of judgement.

would

Its
("The

represent

a

In this context, the

difference between its comments on decommissioning and an elective
process was the difference between a "should" and a "COUld."
In the following weeks, the White House became like a travel
office. First off the mark was Michael Ancram, Minister of State
For Northern

Ireland who arrived in Washington DC to make

British case for elections; next came Gerry Adams,
Sinn Fein, the political wing of the IRA,

the

President of

to make the case against

elections and for immediate all-party talks; next Dick Spring, the
Irish Deputy-Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs to make
the case for Dayton, Ohio-like "proximity talks."
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Nationalist reaction had as much to do with the fact that the
idea of an election to circumvent the IRA, 's unequivocal refusal to
decommission was

first mooted by David Trimble,

leader of the

Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) as with the merit or lack thereof of
the proposal itself.

In the zero-sum arithmetic of the Northern

Ireland conflict, anything supported or proposed by Unionists is
automatically rejected by Nationalists - and conversely.
In a broader context, Nationalist reaction indicates that they
continue to cling to the shibboleth that the British can exert some
magic elixer-like influence on the Unionists,

if only they chose

to. The brouhaha over the election issue obscured one of the most
important underlying and most frequently overlooked realities of
the conflict: Unionist consent to the modalities of the negotiating

process,

not British government

consent is what matters.

The

British can talk to Sinn Fein until the proverbial cows come home,
but unless they bring the unionists along with them talks between
the two can only yield peripheral dividends, not a permanent peace.
For the better part of the last 30 years, Unionists have not
regarded the British government as being the guardian of their
interests.

The marriage of the Union will continue,

Unionists were to ask for a divorce,
not stand in their way.
than

a

convergence

In short,

between

but if the

the British government will

there is more of a divergence

British

interests

in

Ireland

and

Unionist interests, a matter of increasing concern to Unionists,
inclining them to march to the beat of their own drummer.
Major's focus on an election as the only viable way forward
83

allowed Sinn Fein to grab the moral high-ground ("John Major has
now adopted an entirely unionist
Unionist votes in Westminster."

agenda

in

an

attempt

to

buy

One wonders what Tony Blair and

Paddy Ashdown were trying to buy.)
As a result, Sinn Fein was able to make the political running,
keeping its rhetoric skillfully focused on the charge that the
Bri tish

proposals

surrender

to

for

Unionist

an

election

angst

to

signaled

return

to

nothing
the

more

golden

than

days

of

majority rule.
In the barrage of charge and countercharge, Sinn Fein wa& not
called on to declare i ts unequivocal support of the Mitchell's
report six recommendations, which, if accepted by Sinn Fein, would
put it in direct opposition to

the IRA's adamant insistence that

it will not entertain any suggestion of decommissioning, partial or
otherwise,

until it sees fit,

in its own interests,

to adopt an

alternative course of action.
Also

overlooked

in

the

raucous

inspired

by

Major's

miscalculated response to Mitchell were the caveats regarding an
election that were either implicit in Mayor's statement in the
Commons or have since been explicitly spelled out.
An election boycotted by nationalists would be meaningless,

and would be in that most English of phrases a "non-starter."

All

parties would have to participate, which means that all parties
would have to agree on the purpose of the election, the remit of an
elected assembly/forum, the length of time it would sit, the agenda
it would address,

the modalities of decision-making in terms of
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sufficiency

of

consensus;

the

definition

of

consensus;

the

mechanisms to deal with crunch issues, and how to develop fall-back
strategies

to

deal

with

situations

when

inevitable

deadlocks

threatened to derail the process.
Such a forum would have no executive powers,

no legislative

powers, no administrative powers; its terms of reference would be
confined solely to considerations of how to advance multiparty
talks with the clear understanding among all parties that there
could

be a truly inclusive process, a necessary prerequisite for

a lasting peace settlement,

only if all the parties in Northern
In this

Ireland reach common ground on how to proceed.
two governments are,

ironically,

secondary players,

sense,.~

the

enablers of

facilitation rather than the prime movers.
The decommissioning
commission

insightfully

issue

is,

points

of

course,

out,

as

symptomatic

the Mitchell
of

a

larger

problem: the absence of trust. The postures that accompanied the
report's

release

Accordingly,

were

any

a

forum

manifestation
that

would

of

bring

that
the

lack

of

parties

trust.
to

the

conflict together creates an ambience that, if properly cultivated,
could be conducive to trust-building. There is a woeful lack of
such mechanisms in place at the moment.
Trust is a learned behavior .. When one community addresses the
other l i t must do

so with particular sensi ti vi ty to

community's politics. Parties must put
their protagonists.

the other

themselves in the shoes of

They must help their protagonists to bring

their communities with them.

In the end, successful negotiations

are not so much about bringing your community along with you, as
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helping your protagonists bring their communities along with them.
Respect

for

the

positions

of

the

other,

even

in

the

face

of

disagreement, is germane to the whole process.
Furthermore,
negotiators

is

the
an

level

of

exponential

that

trust

function

of

develops
their

among

ability

to

communicate, which, in turn, requires them to invest in each other.
An elected forum,

a pre-negotiating marketplace for the exchange of

ideas, as it were, would provide the political space in which the
down-payments on future investments could be made.
At every level, negotiations should involve the inherent risk
of compromise; indeed, compromise is the essential ingredient of
negotiations,

without

which

there

can

be

no

progress.

Each

compromise is a building block, and as the parties grow to trust
each

other,

they move

from

one

compromise

concessions being made on all sides.

to

the

next,

wi th

Each side becomes invested in

the process; each develops a stake in seeing the other succeed; a
sum of mutual investments develops,

which

provides the cushion

when it comes to the crunch issues.
The Mitchell commission put it most succinctly: "Only resolute
action by the parties themselves will produce results."
BREAKDOWN

In what came as an totally unexpected move, on February 9th,
the IRA shocked the world, and threw the peace-process into seeming
terminal disarray, with the

announcement that its cease fire would

end at 6:00 pm Irish time.
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One

hour

later,

a

bomb

exploded

injuring 43,

killing two people,

in

London's

Canary Warf

and causing an estimated $300

million in damages.
Minutes before the bomb went off, Gerry Adams,

President of

Sinn Fein rang the White House to inform the President's national
security adviser, Anthony Lake "that he had some disturbing news."
Consternation
followed.

and

the

usual

plethora

of

condemnations

A return to the violence-ridden days of 25 years seemed

unthinkable after 18 months of peace during which the ordinary
people of NI could walk the streets

free of the threat of the

random bullet or hidden bomb; during which many on both sides of
the political/religious divide actually got to know each other and
discovered that they shared a common longing for a lasting peace
under whatever political arrangements might bring it to them.
The conventional wisdom, or more correctly, the conventional
wish, in the first few days following the bombing was that it might
have been a "once-off", a signal by the IRA that the peace -process
had to move at a quicker pace, a sign of intense displeasure with
the British government's call for an election, seen in republican
circles

as

appalling

one
one

more
with

stalling
its

maneuver,

implicit

and

suggestions

in
of

this
a

case

an

return

to

"Stormont" rule.
Official responses reflected the trenchant statements by both
governments to get the peace-process back on rails as quickly as
possible.
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Among the preconditions sternly enumerated at one

time or

another that Sinn Fein would now have to meet were:
**

The IRA would have to declare a new cease fire.

**

The cease fire would have to be a permanent cease fire.

**

Sinn Fein would have to condemn the bombing at Canary Warf
(not merely regret it).

**

Sinn would have to disassociate itself from the IRA.

**

The IRA would have to decommission its arms prior to allparty talks.

Both governments announced that until there was a new
fire,

neither

would

hold

talks

with

Sinn

Fein

at

c~ase

ministerial

level, although talks at other levels would still be possible.
One problem facing both governments was how to assess where
Sinn Fein stands in relation to the IRA. If, as Sinn Fein insists,
it

does

not

speak

for

the

IRA

(it

draws

almost

theological

distinctions between being in a position to speak to the IRA and
being able to speak for the IRA; to having influence with the IRA
and having control over the IRA), then this begs the question: What
influence does Sinn Fein have with the IRA, and what can it deliver
in all-party talks, since the widely-held assumption on all sides,
never denied by Sinn Fein when it has been convenient not to do so,
was that Sinn Fein did speak for the IRA. This was the reason for
"wooing" Sinn Fein into the process in the first place.

Indeed,

John Major has gone so far as to say that the two

organizations are interchangeable in their leadership structures
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and Tories routinely refer to Sinn Fein/IRA,

to reinforce their

contention that both organizations are one and the same.
government

holds

a

not

dissimilar

view,

but

(The Irish

without

the

ingenuousness the informs the British assessment.)
On the one hand, neither government could decide whether to
feed Gerry Adams to the republican hounds baying at his heels; on
the other hand, they cannot decide whether he is still their best
bet in reaching the IRA and having an influence on it. To further
complicate matters, both governments still regard him as the most
reasonable, able, and sophisticated of the Sinn Fein leaders in the
dancing chorus. And there seems no one on the horizon who seems
capable of replacing him.
But if not Adams,

then who?

How do you keep the

communication open with the IRA open?

line of

And with whom?

How do you maintain connection, what backtrack channels do you
construct

when

figuratively,

the

men

calling

the

shots,

both

li terally and

are faceless and guard their facelessness with the

diligence of the possessed?
Ironically,

the

decision of both

governments

to

meetings at ministerial level with Adams and his team
sub~ministerial

rule

out

(although

contacts are being maintained) weakened Adams at

the very time when he needed to be strengthened.
The two governments' decision diminished Adams' clout with the
IRA, or whatever residual clout he had left, just when he had most
need to show the IRA that he still has some real clout with London
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and Dublin.
A

fundamental

miscalculation

in

the

analysis

of

both

governments has been their belief that Adams could carry the IRA
with him.
him on

Hence the British thought he could carry the IRA with

decommissioning,

decommissioning

of

despite

arms

the

prior

to

IRA making
all-party

it

clear

talks

that

would

be

tantamount to an admission of surrender and was simply not oni and
Dublin believed

that

he

could

carry

the

IRA with

him on

the

question of consent (that the consent of a majority of the people
of

Northern

Ireland

is

necessary

before

a

change

in

constitutional status of Northern Ireland can take place.)

the
Both

proved to be ill-founded illusions.
Inherent to the problem is that the peace-process itself as
ini tially designed and executed was fatally flawed,

al though to

point that out in the euphoria that accompanied the first peace in
Northern Ireland in nearly 30 years left one open to the accusation
of being a doomsayer,

even of being somehow opposed to the peace

process itself. The doubting Thomases kept their heads down and
their doubts to themselves.
The cease fire was a necessary but not a sufficient condition
for peace.

All parties held tenaciously to their belief in its

self-generating sustainability, even when the political circles to
be squared became political circles to be cubed.
While it is easy to put the blame for the breakdown on the
impasse over decommissioning of arms and the British government's
rejection

of

the

Mitchell

commission's
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suggestion

regarding

decommissioning

and

talks

in

tandem

although

how

Mitchell

envisaged bringing the Unionist parties into the negotiating tent
is another matter),
breakdown were

the cold reality is that the origins of the

embedded

in

process itself was built,

the

premises

upon

which

the

peace

premises based on false expectations

emerging out of the belief that some agreed end to the conflict
would emerge, if only the guns were silenced.

On

February 18,

1996

Sinn

Fein gave

its

response

to

the

demands being made upon it. In a speech at Conway Mill, Adams set
out the basis for a recommencement of negotiations:
Any new process

[he said] must contain copper fastened and

unambiguous public assurances that all-party talks will be
initiated by both governments at the earliest possible date,
they

[must] proceed with urgency and within an agreed time

frame upon an inclusive agenda, and without any preconditions
whatsoever. A peace process is a means to an end.

The end is

a negotiated settlement - an agreed peace settlement.
requires

change.

Sinn

Fein

have

argued

that

That

change

is

required in three main areas. There is a need for political
and

constitutional

democraticization

change.
and

There

is

a

need

demilitarization

also
of

for

a

the

situation .. Because republicans are committed to a total end to
British rule in Ireland,

we have an acute sense of what the

breakdown of the peace process means.
No mention of cease fires; no mentioning of decommissioning.

91

Indeed, if one were to identify the one obstacle to any kind
of progress to try and put the shattered pieces of the peace process back together, that obstacle is endemic lack of trust.
As

things

stood,

together.

Poorly

stalemate.

What

no one

conceived
remained

knew how to put
chess

to

paramilitaries would respond.

be

games
seen

Whether,

the pieces back

invariably

was

how

lead

the

to

Loyalist

in the event of further

bombings in mainland British cities, they would resort to targets
in Dublin and other cities in the Republic, or whether they would
wait for the IRA to breach the cease fire in the North.

If the

latter were to take place, it would herald a return to the days of
escalating sectarian killings,

and unfortunately,

perhaps that's

the way it may yet have to bei that things will have to get a lot
worse before they get better. But for the time being, the Loyalists
have held their fire.

And the IRA has studiously avoided taking

its campaign to the North.

WHAT WENT WRONG?

** Both the British government and Sinn Fein regarded each
other as being responsible for bringing the cease fire about.

(John

Major: "the IRA came to us and said 'the conflict is over, help us
move the process forward.'

Gerry Adams:

'[we]

John Hume and I,

along with Albert Reynolds and elements of Irish America persuaded
the IRA to call a complete cessation of violence ... ')
In

real i ty,

the

cease

fire

was

directly among the parties involved.
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brokered,

not

negotiated

Thus both sides came out of

the cease fire bargaining with different understandings of what the
cease fire involved.

** The British believed that Adams et al spoke authoritatively
on behalf of the IRA.

The IRA thought the British could bring the

Unionists to the table,if only they had the will to do.

Both were

incorrect. In terms of time-frames both sides were working to the
ticking of different clocks, and therefore often at cross-purposes.

** For the British, the peace process would, by its nature be
long

drawn-out,

necessarily

bureaucratic:

the

mandarins

of

Whitehall had to have their time to ply the wiles of their trade.
For Sinn Fein, the peace process was a matter of extreme urgency:
the IRA had put them under time constraints to deliver.

**
process.
was

Both

sides

made

tactical

decisions

that

delayed

the

The IRA would not give an undertaking that the cease fire

permanent

"permanent")

note

the

difference

between

"complete"

and

Sinn Fein were under the impression that all-party

talks would take place within three months of the declaration of
the cease fire, without further modalities having to be worked out.
For the British, there continued to be the question of how to bring
the Unionists to the table. The IRA never sufficiently appreciated
that what mattered was
British

consent.

precedence

over

getting Unionist

Hence
everything

the

issue

else

and

of

consent

to

talks,

decommissioning

effectively

stalled

not
took
the

process.

**

The

IRA's

commitment

to

non-violence

was

continually

questioned in view of punishment shootings it routinely carried out
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transported the bomb was stolen in Larne three weeks before the
Canary Wharf bombing, as were the tax disc and new licence plates.
It was ferried to Strandlyre in Scotland and driven South. This was
not

just

a

knee-j erk

response

to

the

Bri tish

reaction

to

the

Mitchell Report; the British response merely allowed for moving up
the date to capitalize on a situation where they could say "the
Brits made us do it."
**

There

is

a

convenient

propensity

regarding the unchanging hallmarks of

for

amnesia

to

set

Irish Republicanism when

peace might seem to be in the offing:
**

only physical force will work; physical force is the Dnly
thing the British understand - and respect.

**

total distrust of the political process

**

the British as always out to divide and conquer; that they
stall as a matter of strategy to a sap the will of their
opponents and create divisions among them as they attempt
to assess what it is the British are really up to.

**

a

guarantee

of

British

withdrawal

is

a

necessary

all

intents

prerequisite to a cease fire
**

the Army Council reigns supreme

**

the

southern

establishment

has

for

and

purposes sold out
** The British and Irish governments, and the SDLP were under
the impression that Sinn Fein had accepted the doctrine of consent.
Sinn Fein had not, or even if it had made tentative moves in that
direction in 1994/'95,

those moves were not moot in light of its

failure to sign the final report of the commission on peace and
reconciliation, and the reinstatement in Adams' speech on February
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15 that the aim of the movement was

to end,

once and for all,

British rule in Ireland.

** The failure on the part of both governments to understand
that what the republican movement feared most of all was a split,
because of the catastrophic impact of splits on the movement in the
past; and that when it came to a split or the doves having to go
along reluctantly with the hawks,

the

doves went along in the

interests of unity - and because they are disciplined members of
the movement, for the most part tempered and trained by many years
in jail for their beliefs.
THE WAY FORWARD

There are many who would argue that the recent IRA bombings in
London achieved their tactical goal,

forcing the British and Irish

governments to set a date for multi-party talks and bringing to an
end

the

stalemate

that

had

bogged

down

the

peace

process

in

Northern Ireland for the last eighteen months.
Although both governments have agreed to a complicated mish
mash of measures including Bosnia-style proximity talks, elections
for an forum which will select members of negotiating teams, and a
date for the start of all-party talks, these measures were cobbled
together

in

response

to

the

desperate

attempt

by

the

two

governments to keep the process alive at almost any cost. Of most
significance, however, is the fact that they have not induced the
IRA to reinstate its ceasefire.
Anglo-Irish

attempt

to

Indeed, the IRA has rejected the

revive

the

process

as

"inadequate,"

reafirmmed that "under no circumstances" would it decommission its
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in West Belfast, heightening Unionist insistence on decommissioning
prior to talks.

For the IRA punishment beatings and the like were

a way of letting the British know it had not simply folded its tent
and lacked the will to go on.

Both sides misread the signals of

the other.

* * For over a year,

the British made decommissioning the

primary condition for progress, while they should have known that
decommissioning prior to all-party talks was simply not on

That

it would simply be an admission of surrender by the IRA.

** And this is the crux of the failure of both the British and
the IRA to understand the imperatives that were the driving forces
behind the decisions of both:

On the British side the failure to

understand how Irish Republicanism works and what drives it.

That

Sinn Fein is subordinate to the army council; that the decision to
agree

to

a

cease

fire

was

opposed by perhaps

30%

of

council

members; that the hard liners were waiting in the wings should the
Adams strategy fail;
army

council

that recent changes in the personnel on the

indicated

a

waning

of

the

influence

of

the

Adams/McGuinness faction of support. That the Adams/McGuinness axis
of

support

on

the

army

council

lost

control

of

the

council.

McGuinness was replaced. Hard liners took over. In their view, Sinn
Fein had nothing to show for its political initiative.
It was back to basics. The gun worked. It was the only thing
the British understood.

** In the view of most of those close to the IRA, the end of
the cease fire was planned for the end of February.
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The lorry that

armory until

there was

a

"final

negotiated settlement"

to

the

conflict, and dismissed out-of-hand the calls for a new ceasefire.
And even if a new ceasefire did somehow materialize,

it would not

bring real peace -- peace that is the product of a durable and
lasting political settlement.
In short, to say the IRA has bombed its way to the negotiating
table or has lit a metaphorical fuse under the peace process would
be to simplify the conflict to the point of willful distortion.

At

the moment there is nothing the IRA can bomb its way to.
In Northern Ireland, Yeats' terrible beauties have an almost
quixotic penchant for becoming terrible mistakes,

parasites that

feed on each other with an insatiable appetite to capture what has
never

existed

nightmare,

in

the

cause

of

a

dream

that

has

brought

only

in the name of an aspiration few ascribe to but none

will renounce.
Irredentist

Irish Nationalism had gone back to

its

roots.

"Brits Out," and if it takes the death of some poor Bengali blown
to rubble in the explosion at Canary Wharf to advance the cause of
a united Ireland,

so be it.

For the hard liners who had seized

control of the IRA's Army Council, the cease fire was simply war by
other means, and when it failed to deliver a place for Sinn Fein at
all-party talks without the IRA having to commit itself to a series
of unacceptable conditions, its utility was over.
if

in

time

a

restoration

of

a

ceasefire

better

And, no doubt,
serves

their

purposes, they will as easily opt for that route.
Meanwhile,

what

remains of the peace process continues
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to

disintegrate in the face of what amounts to virtual paralysis in
the corridors of power in London and Dublin, and the sense of the
lack of trust among the key players on all sides - even on the same
side - is palpable.
Indeed, if one were to identify the one obstacle to any kind
of progress to try and put the shattered pieces of the peace process back together,

that obstacle is endemic lack of trust.

Finger-pointing is in vogue, whispers of who is to blame for what
abound,

even

as

the

whisperers

themselves

admit

to

the

pointlessness of the practice. Political shadow-boxing, where the
clever feint,

counts as a substantial punch, usurps the place of

honest dialogue.
But there are ways forward.

** Take Sinn Fein at its word. If it does not speak for the
IRA,

uncouple

between

the

the two.
British

In that case,

and

the

IRA

to

arrange

for direct

resolve

the

talks

question

of

decommissioning. The late president of Israel, Yizhak Rabin said:
"You do not make peace with your friends but with your enemies."
Rabin understood the risk implicit in that course of action, and in
the end he paid for that belief with his life. In Northern Ireland
the time has come for the risk-takers to sieze hold of the peace
process.
There
bilateral

must
basis.

be

enemy-to-enemy
That

means

intermediaries.

Only

they

decommissioning,

related

head-on

Britain
can

security
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make
matters

negotiations

and

the

the

deals

and

the

on

IRA

a
no

regarding
release

of

prisoners that will last.

** Set-up an open-ended negotiating forum, beginning with the
Social Democratic and Labour Party

(SDLP),

the Ulster Unionist

Party (UUP) , the Alliance Party and the Democratic Unionist Party
(DUP).

Any party that is invited to participate would have to meet

certain criteria; all parties would be free to abstain or join at
whatever point they wished to, provided they met the participating
criteria.

** The key criteria for participation in the forum should be
a party's acceptance of the Mitchell principles.

**

The

Irish

Unionists parties,

government,

British

the Alliance Party,

government,

SDLP,

the

in fact all parties, with

the exception of Sinn Fein have said they accept and will honor
these

principles.

This

unusual

unanimity

among

the

parties

representing at least 85 per cent of the electorate in Northern
Ireland must be built on; it represents the nearest thing to common
ground that all the constitutional parties have agreed to since
1969 and would enjoy the support of the vast majority of the people
on every side of the political/religious divide.

** Sinn Fein would have two choices:

Freed from supposedly

having to speak for the IRA,

it could subscribe to the Mitchell

principles and join the forum,

leaving it up to the IRA to hammer

out its own accommodations wi th the British government.
could

opt

to

stay

out

of

the

process

by

not

Or it

subscribing

to

Mitchell, await the outcome of the British/IRA talks, thus leaving
the question of joining the forum open.
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Either way the negotiating train would leave the station, and
as long as the center
could

either

come

(SDLP and UUPl

along

for

the

stayed aboard,

ride,

or

risk

the others

marginalizing

themselves.
Above

all,

begin.

Allowing

a

vacuum

to

develop

on

the

political front will simply ensure that violence will inevitably
follow.

BUILDING A FRAMEWORK

As regards constitutional models, possibilities are profuse,
ranging from resuscitation of the old Stormont majority rule,

to

various power-sharing recipes with or without an Irish Dimension,
to

forms

of

an

all-Ireland

federation

or

confederation,

some

ingeniously designed, to models that would place Northern Ireland
in the context of Europe,
autonomy,

models

of

calls

for

consociation,

independence,
joint

or at

least

authority,

and

cantonisation.
A review of the extensive literature on Northern Ireland would
put

particular

emphasis

on

the

following

as

essential

considerations that will have to frame any future settlement:
•

An almost universal acceptance in the Protestant community

that power will have to be shared with Catholics.
•

An

acknowledgment that an Irish Dimension exists which

must be accommodated but an absolute refusal on the part
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of Protestants to agree to any arrangement that would give
the

Republic

an

executive

role

in

the

government

of

Northern Ireland.
•

Widespread disagreement

on

the

form

that

relationship

should take, varying from the "good neighbors" formulation
and "cooperation on matters of mutual concern" variations
to

a

relationship

that

would

give

the

Republic

an

executive role in the government of Northern Ireland.
•

Explicit recognition of the fact that the future of the
economies of the two parts of Ireland are inextricably
linked to a Single Market Europe.

•

Widespread agreement that Northern Ireland should be as
self-governing as possible.

•

A majority rule, whether simple or proportionate, is not
a viable proposition;

the nationalist communi ty has no

obligation to agree to it and has the critical mass to
prevent its imposition;
•

The Unionist community will not accept an administration
for

Northern

Ireland that

gives

an

executive

role

to

anyone from outside the U.K.
•

A Bill of Rights is almost universally endorsed as being
a desirable part of any settlement.

•

Proportionate power sharing.
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•

Equal power sharing to give literal expression to

the

equality of the two traditions.
•

No

accommodation

can

work

as

long

as

one

community

continues to police the other.
•

If there is to be lasting peace in Ireland, ways must be
found

to

bring

Sinn

Fein/IRA

and

the

Loyalist

paramilitaries into the process.

•

Special

majorities

required

to

secure

passage

of

legislation.
•

Various mechanisms to give veto rights to the minori ty
with regard to matters of particular concern to it.

•

An acknowledgment that the structure of the Anglo- Irish
Agreement signed by London and Dublin in November,

1985

and, among other things, giving the Republic of Ireland a
consultative

role

asymmetrical:

in

If

Northern

the

South

Irish
speaks

affairs
for

was

Northern

nationalists and the British government is neutral, who
represents the interests of the Unionists?
that

the

regard,

Anglo-Irish
it

adds

to

Agreement
the

is

democratic

To the extent

deficient
deficit

in
and

this
is

a

legitimate source of guidance in the Unionist
community.
In Northern Ireland,

as currently constituted,

may be discarded are that:
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notions that

•

Northern Ireland is like any other part of the U.K.;

•

The Northern Ireland communities will agree on Northern
Ireland independence;

•

The U. K.

will quit Northern

Ireland under pressure of

violence;
•

The Irish Republic will renounce the aim of Irish unity;

•

Irish unity is a realistic prospect in the foreseeable
future.

Ultimately, the question is how to establish a basis of trust
between the two communities, especially when the two communities
become more segregated.

There

is a

need for

some

interactive

process that will enable each community to "learn" the language and
mode of thinking of the other.

This is especially true in relation

to the Protestant community which is highly distrustful of the
Catholics' "hidden agenda":

to somehow deceive them into becoming

part of a united Ireland.
Trust is, of course, related to uncertainty, especially uncertainty
over the constitutional status of Northern Ireland, and hence the
need

for

some mechanism to make

political consensus is to emerge,

that

status

a

non-issue.

If

then mutual trust and respect,

tolerance of others, and a willingness to compromise must exist at
all levels of society within Northern Ireland.
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NEGOTIATING PRINCIPLES
1) There should be transparency in the negotiating
process, openness and the uncamouflaged. The people
of Ireland should be made part of the process, so that
when obstacles emerge, and they will, they can be discussed
and clarified in the public domain. On no account, should an
impression be conveyed that deals are being done behind closed
doors.
2)
Catholic negotiators most eschew the
fanciful
footwork, and recognize that the Protestant propensity
for theinductive is an inherent part of their tradition,
and must be accepted and respected in that context.
3) Every party must recognize, as must both governments,
that different communities use language in different
ways, and that structures should be put in place that
anticipate and defuse the misunderstandings that will
arise because of these differences.
4) Progress only comes when negotiating parties learn to
start trusting each other. Trust is earned. When one
community addresses the other, it must do so with
particular sensitivity to the other community's politics.
Parties must themselves in the shoes of their
protagonists.
They must help their protagonists to bring
their communities with them.
In the end, successful
negotiations are not so much about bringing your
community along with you, as helping your protagonists
bring their communities along with them. Respect for the
others' positions is germane to the whole process.
5) The level of trust that develops among negotiators is
a function of their ability to communicate, which, in
turn, requires them to develop a common vocabulary.
6) If political consensus is to emerge, then mutual trust
and respect, tolerance of others, and a willingness to
compromise must exist at all levels in Northern Ireland.
In this regard, where there is a transparent absence of
trust on each side of the divide, due in part to
ingrained cultural differences with regard to language
and process - some of which have their origins in

religious structures and competing claims to legitimacy
that developed over the centuries - a negotiating process
that stipulates that "nothing is agreed until everything
is agreed" sets up a situation more like a poker table
than a negotiating table.
7) The formula that "nothing is agreed until everything is
agreed," discourages openness and risk-taking,
and
encourages every side to play their cards close to their
chests, making it difficult to create the ambience in
which accommodation emerges.
8) At every level, negotiations should involve the inherent
risk of compromise; indeed, compromise is the essential
ingredient of negotiations, without which there can be no
negotiations. Each compromise is a building block, and
as the parties grow to trust each other, the move from
one compromise to the next, with concessions, though
difficult, being made on all sides. Each side becomes
invested in the process, each develops a stake in seeing
the other succeed, a sum of mutual investments develops,
which provides the cushion when it comes to the crunch
issues.
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